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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that aim to develop economic models to explain
sovereign debt crises. Chapter 2 provides the dynamic general equilibrium model of en-
dogenous sovereign default, incorporating nancial intermediaries. By a governments
decision to default, government bonds become non-performing and nancial interme-
diaries eliminate them from their net worth. While other literature on endogenous
default models assumes that the default state is exogenously given, only depending
on TFP or endowment, the model in Chapter 2 creates a mechanism by which the
default state is contingent on the amount of debt outstanding in the non-default state.
Through this feature, the model quanties the nancial amplication e¤ect on the
economy and shows the phenomenon of "Too-Big-to-Default". The model explains the
important features of the Argentinean default in 2001, capturing the default frequency,
the debt-to-GDP ratio and moments of main variables.
Chapter 3 proposes a new sovereign debt crisis model which is applicable to an
advanced country, assuming the governments incapability to serve its debts rather
than willingness of repayment. The scal limit is dened as the sum of discounted
future primary surplus under the tax rate to maximize tax revenue. When the debt
outstanding exceeds the scal limit, the government falls into debt crisis. The economic
contraction in the crisis results from the exogenous tax rate and decreased imported
inputs. The model replicates the high debt-to-GDP ratio, which the endogenous model
cannot assume, and captures movements of important variables of the Spanish debt
crisis in around 2012.
Chapter 4 introduce foreign bonds based on the model in Chapter 3, for the analysis
of several countries such as Greece and Ireland in which a majority of bonds is held
by foreign agents. In the model, the government issues bonds for foreign investors,
and that leads the outow of domestic output. Instead of government bonds, house-
holds adopt capital for their inter-temporal utility maximization. Also, the scal limit
is drawn from the exogenous distribution. The simulation result for the Greek econ-
omy generally explains the contraction of its economy by the crisis in around 2012
although the e¤ect of imported inputs is overestimated and that of domestic inputs is
underestimated.
Keywords: Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium, Financial Intermediaries,
Non-Performing Bonds, Fiscal Limit, La¤er Curve, Developing and Advanced Coun-
tries, Domestic and Foreign Debts
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Sovereign debt crises have huge impacts on the economy. The Argentinean government
declared default and suspended all debt repayments in December 2001. The amount
of privately held debt was more than 100 billion US dollars1, and this default caused
an enormous economic contraction. Real GDP dropped by about 18.9% in 2002Q1
from the average in 1998, the unemployment rate exceeded 22% and the poverty ratio
reached 14%2. Depositors were limited in how much cash they could withdraw, and
riots broke out in many large cities. The recent European debt crisis also drove a severe
recession in several eurozone countries, especially Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and
Spain (PIIGS). The Greek case was the hardest among these countries, and even though
ve years has passed since the Greek government virtually defaulted in 2012, GDP is
still stagnant and the debt-to-GDP ratio remains high.
If the occurrence of sovereign debt crises were exceptional, the analysis of sovereign
debt crisis would not be so meaningful. However, according to Das, Papaioannou and
1Before the Greek default, Russias default in 1918 was regarded as the largest in history. According
to Zettelmeyer et al. (2013), the estimated present value of that default is equivalent to about 100
billion euros.
2I adopt the denition of poverty rate as people who are living on less than 1.9 dollar per day. The
data source is the World Bank.
1
Trebesch (2012), sovereign debt restructuring were implemented more than 600 times
in 95 countries from 1950 to 2010. Although 447 debt exchanges were through the
Paris Club, 186 cases were conducted with private creditors. In addition to this, public
debt overhang is one of the big economic concerns today. Figure 1.1 (a) depicts the
transition and projection of gross debt-to-GDP ratios in several selected countries and
the averages of advanced and emerging economies. The ratio in Japan is the worst
among OECD countries, exceeding 230% of GDP. After the collapse of the bubble
economy in the early 1990s, the Japanese government sustained aggregate demand
through its expenditure. Recently, social security costs have been a huge burden for
the government due to the aging society. The debt-to-GDP ratio in the U.S. increased in
the 2008 nancial crisis. Since then, political turmoil related to the debt ceiling problem
has occurred several times. Argentina defaulted in 2001 with massive debts and most of
its bonds were issued in dollars, so the devaluation of the peso by abandoning the dollar-
pegged exchange rate triggered a dramatic increase in its debt-to-GDP ratio. In 2005
and 2010, the government and most creditors agreed to debt restructuring with high
haircut rates. In Greece, the sovereign debt crisis has caused severe recession since 2010
and the government virtually defaulted in 2012. International organizations sustained
the governments budget by providing bailouts in exchange for austerity. However, the
ratio remains high due to weak economic recovery and political turmoil. The average
debt-to-GDP ratios in both advanced and emerging economies are expected to remain
high, reaching around 100% and 50% respectively. Although the ratio in emerging
economies is not as high as in advanced economies, it does not indicate that emerging
economies are safer than advanced economies, because of lower credit provided to these
governments by investors.
The main cause of high debts is social security costs, especially in advanced coun-
tries. As the number of people who need nancial assistance from a government in-
creases, the expenditure on social security costs increases. The elderly tend to rely on
2
Figure 1.1: Public Debt
(a) Gross Debt-to-GDP Ratio (b) The Projection of Dependency Ratio
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Note 1: The projections of debt-to-GDP ratio and dependency ratio are estimated by the IMF and OECD respectively.
Note 2: The dependency ratio represents population aged 65 years and over to population aged 20 - 64 years.
social security such as pensions, subsidies for medical treatment and livelihood pro-
tection. Thus, if the proportion of elderly people over working people (or taxpayers)
increases, it will be a burden for the government. Figure 1.1 (b) is the projection of the
dependency ratio estimated by the OECD. The Japanese dependency ratio is expected
to keep increasing at a rapid pace, reaching 80% in 2050. The increased pace of the
dependency ratio in the EU is not as fast as in Japan but it will exceed 50% in 2050.
The ratio in the U.S. will also increase until about 2030 but will be more constant
after that. In China, although the current dependency ratio is not high, the ratio is
anticipated to increase with high speed because of the one child policy which was in
place from 1979 to 2015. The average ratio of OECD countries will keep increasing
and approach 50% in 2050. Considering these situations, it is expected that social
security costs will put long-term pressure on government expenditure. Besides, the
growth rates in developed countries are relatively low, so these governments are not
able to count on increases in tax revenue from economic growth. Hence, public debts
are a large problem and we cannot simply deny the possibility of public debt-related
crises in relatively large economic countries in future. It is important to have models
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to understand the mechanism of crises, quantify their e¤ects on the economy and have
policy implications to minimize social welfare loss.
However, the current models to analyze the sovereign debt crises are far from meet-
ing these goals. The biggest reason is the intricacy of sovereign debt crises. The crises
are caused by many factors and a¤ect the economy in many ways. For example, a vast
literature emphasizes the amplication mechanism through the nancial sector. Also,
sovereign default models usually assume a governments willingness rather than the
ability to pay debt. However, it is hard to a¢ rm that sovereign defaults are decisions
of governmentswillingness in many cases. In addition, the current account is closely
related to scal surplus and debt sustainability. In fact, the current account decits in
Greece, Spain and Portugal were quite high at the time of the European debt crisis, and
also the Argentinean default in 2001. The exchange rate system is also a matter of debt
crisis. The Argentinean peso was pegged to the U.S. dollar, and that reduced Argen-
tinean competitiveness. However, the devaluation of the peso caused a sudden increase
in nominal debt value because most bonds are issued in dollars. Not only these factors
but also many other factors a¤ect sovereign debt crises, such as market sentiment, po-
litical uncertainty and economic size. It is extremely di¢ cult to include many factors
in the model. Thus, this thesis focuses on the interaction between sovereign default
and nancial intermediaries, and provides a new model which is applicable to advanced
economies in order to capture the characteristics of these countries by assuming the
governments incapability of repayment of debts rather than its willingness.
1.2 Key Research Questions and Findings
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. The principal objective is to
provide economic models to analyze sovereign debt crises. In Chapter 2, the model
focuses on the relation between sovereign default and nancial contraction. Chapters 3
4
and 4 comprise models for the analysis of sovereign debt crises in advanced countries.
Chapter 2 proposes a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous sovereign
default with nancial intermediaries. The overall framework of the model is as fol-
lows. The benevolent government maximizes householdsutility by two instruments:
issuance of new government bonds and the decision to default or repay its debts. In the
case of default, the government loses its access to the bond market, its bonds become
non-performing, and nancial intermediaries have to eliminate a certain proportion of
these non-performing bonds from their net worth. This balance sheet e¤ect causes
contraction in lending and output. The characteristic of the model is that the state of
default is contingent on the state of non-default through the amount of debt outstand-
ing, while prior research assumes that the default state is exogenously given, depending
only on TFP or endowment. The model can quantify the magnitude of economic con-
traction through the nancial sector by changing the haircut rate or the proportion of
government bonds held by domestic agents. In addition to this, the models features
explain the phenomenon of "Too-Big-to-Default", meaning the government does not
choose to default under the accumulation of huge debts because default e¤ects on the
economy would be too severe. The model is calibrated by the Argentinean economy
around its default in 2001, and its compatibility with the actual default is generally
sound. The simulation result captures important features such as default frequency,
the debt-to-GDP ratio and moments of main variables.
Chapter 3 provides a new sovereign debt crisis model which is applicable to an ad-
vanced country. The canonical endogenous default model, assuming the governments
willingness to default, is not regarded as an appropriate tool for the analysis of sov-
ereign debt crises in advanced countries because the model needs to assume that the
government can estimate the defaults e¤ect on the economy precisely before the de-
cision of default and its e¤ects have to be relatively small and short. In addition, the
model cannot replicate the high debt-to-GDP ratio as accumulated by many advanced
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countries. Thus, I propose a new model for the analysis of sovereign debt crisis in an
advanced country, which assumes the governments capability of debt repayment. The
mechanism of the model is as follows. The government issues new bonds to households
in order to nance the deciency in its budget, but if government debts exceed a scal
limit, the government falls into crisis. The scal limit is dened as the summation of
discounted future primary surplus when the government sets its tax rate to maximize
tax revenue. Due to the crisis, the government is obligated to set the exogenous tax
rate during the crisis as an austerity measure and the amount of imports of inter-
mediate goods decreases due to higher interest rates for working capital in the crisis
state. The model assumes domestic bonds for the analysis of the Spanish economy.
It replicates characteristics of advanced countries such as high enough debt-to-GDP
ratio, reasonable crisis frequency and also moments of main variables.
Chapter 4 extends the model of sovereign debt crisis in an advanced country for the
case of foreign bonds. Although the majority of government bond holders are domestic
agents in most advanced countries, foreign nations hold the majority of government
bonds in some countries such as Greece and Ireland which su¤ered in the European debt
crisis. Thus, in this model, I assume foreign investors purchase and price government
bonds instead of domestic households. The aggregate resource constraint is a¤ected
by the net outow of domestic output. Also, I introduce capital for the maximization
of inter-temporal utility because households do not have access to the bond market.
In addition to this, I assume the scal limit is drawn from the exogenous distribution
because the government has a lower incentive to serve debts. I calibrate the Greek
economy around its virtual default in 2012. Although the model underestimates the
domestic contraction and overestimates the e¤ects of restriction of imported inputs due
to the assumption of nancial autarky of working capital acquisition, the model ts
the important moments of the economy.
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1.3 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapters 2 proposes a dynamic general equilibrium
model of endogenous sovereign default incorporating nancial intermediaries, evaluat-
ing the Argentinean economy around its default in 2001. Chapter 3 provides a sovereign
debt crisis model which is applicable to an advanced country instead of the endogenous
sovereign default model, and examines its compatibility with the debt crisis in Spain.
Chapter 4 extends the previous chapters model for a foreign debt countrys case, and
analyzes the virtual Greek default. Chapter 5 concludes with a brief discussion of
results and future research.
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Chapter 2
Sovereign Default and Financial
Intermediaries
2.1 Introduction
Sovereign defaults entail nancial crises. Before the 21st century, most sovereign de-
faults happened in less nancially developed countries. However, recent sovereign de-
faults such as those in Argentina in 2001 and Greece in 2012 alert us that default can
occur in nancially established countries. Sovereign defaults in these countries cause
nancial contractions and amplify economic downturns. Today, some countries with
relatively large nancial systems accumulate a large proportion of public debts, so we
cannot deny the possibility of the occurrence of another Argentina or Greece in the
future. Thus, I believe it is important to comprehend the mechanism of interaction
between sovereign default and nancial intermediaries.
I propose incorporating nancial intermediaries into dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model of endogenous sovereign default introduced by Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981). The economy is divided into states of non-default and default, and a govern-
ment has two policies in the non-default state: the issuance of new government bonds
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in order to smooth householdsconsumption and the decision of default or repayment.
This governments decision is conducted by comparing value functions of default and
non-default1. If the government chooses default, the economy receives two penalties.
The rst penalty is the governments non-access to the bond market, which is a com-
mon assumption of the endogenous sovereign default model. The government loses the
trust of lenders, so it cannot issue new bonds during the time the default state. The
second penalty is nancial contraction. Government bonds become non-performing
and nancial intermediaries have to eliminate the non-performing bonds from their net
worth. Then, the size of nancial intermediariesbalance sheet shrinks, and that leads
to a decline in working capital lending to rms. Eventually, output and consumption
drop. The low level of net worth continues until the government regains the non-default
state. Aside from nancial intermediaries and the government, there are three other
agents in my model: households, goods producing rms and foreign investors. House-
holds possess goods producing rms and nancial intermediaries, provide their labor
force to the rms, deposit to nancial intermediaries and consume goods. The rms
borrow working capital from nancial intermediaries, acquire labor force and produce
goods. Foreign investors undertake the rest of government bonds that domestic -
nancial intermediaries do not hold and price the government bonds depending on the
probability of default.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized in two points. First, while
prior research assumes that the default state depends only on TFP or endowment
regardless of the amount of bonds in the non-default period, the state of default in my
model is contingent on the state of non-default. That is, because government bonds
in the non-default state become non-performing, the amount of non-performing bonds
1Private nancial contracts are guaranteed by law. If private agents break contracts, penalties are
forcibly imposed by courts. However, this mechanism does not function on the sovereign bond market
because no organization can force it to repay its borrowing to creditors. Instead, it is considered that
the government will lose access to the bond market and the economy will be punished or penalised due
to the governments decision to default. In theory, the endogenous sovereign default model usually
assumes exclusion from bond markets and direct punishments such as autarky or low endowment.
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that nancial intermediaries have to eliminate from their net worth depends on the
amount of government debts at the time of the governments decision to default. This
feature allows us to quantify the nancial amplication e¤ects on the economy by
changing the haircut rate or proportion of government bonds held by domestic agents.
In addition to this, the model can describe the phenomenon as "Too-Big-to-Default".
If the government accumulates too much debt, the amount of non-performing bonds
that nancial intermediaries have to eliminate will be large and the government will
not be able to choose default by itself2. Second, my model ts the actual default well.
I calibrate the model for the Argentinean economy, which defaulted in December 2001,
and the simulation result captures important features such as moments of variables,
the default frequency and the premium of government bonds.
Related Literature
This chapter relates to some prior literature studying sovereign default and nancial
friction. Based on the endogenous default model introduced by Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) analyze the e¤ect of sov-
ereign default in a framework of real business cycle models. Mendoza and Yue (2012)
introduce nancial autarky as direct punishment for choosing default.
However, Borensztein and Panizza (2008) point out that exclusion from the nan-
cial market and direct sanctions are not enough to grasp the mechanism of default
e¤ects. They emphasize that the domestic nancial system amplies the default e¤ect
on the economy because nancial intermediaries hold a large proportion of sovereign
bonds. Several papers incorporate the nancial sector into the endogenous sovereign
default. Sosa Padilla (2014) studies the e¤ect of sovereign default via the nancial sys-
tem. Perez (2015) quanties nancial contraction through the e¤ects of balance sheets
2This feature implies that governments, especially in developed countries, which accumulate mas-
sive debts cannot choose default by themselves due to the huge impact on the economy. Bi (2012)
mentions that the endogenous sovereign default model is not applicable for developed countries. In-
stead she uses the scal limit to analyze sovereign defaults in these countries. Refer to the next chapter
about scal limits.
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and liquidity. Engler and Ste¤en (2014) assume heterogeneous banks and introduce
dysfunction in the interbank market as the default punishment. The main di¤erence
of my model from theirs is that the default state is contingent on the amount of debts
in the non-default state while their papers assume the default state depends only on
exogenous shocks. Theoretically, Gennaioli et al. (2014a) present a framework of sov-
ereign default, internalizing its e¤ect on domestic banks. They show that if banks hold
more government bonds, a governments incentive to choose default is smaller because
damages to the banksbalance sheets and contractions in lending are larger.
Some papers that extend the framework of the endogenous sovereign default mech-
anism. Yue (2010) studies endogenous default and economic recovery by incorporating
ex post debt renegotiation. DErasmo (2011) includes the governments reputation to
explain the high debt-to-GDP ratio. Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) introduce long-
term bonds within the sovereign default model. Gu (2015) assumes a two countries
model and analyzes the default e¤ect on trades. Kushwah (2014) explores default
e¤ects on nancial ows in a monetary union.
Layout
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 shows empirical evidence of the
relation between sovereign default and the nancial sector. Section 2.3 presents a model
to analyze the e¤ect of sovereign default incorporating nancial intermediaries. Section
2.4 sets functional forms and parameters and explains the cyclical co-movements of the
model. Then, it delivers the quantitative results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence of Relation between Sov-
ereign Debt Crises and Financial Intermediaries
As the Greek default shows, a default in an economically big nation has a huge im-
pact on the economy. One of the biggest reasons would be that developed countries
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usually have large nancial systems. Financial intermediaries hold a large proportion
of government bonds as safe assets and the interest rates of government bonds are
the benchmark of the nations other interest rates such as housing loans and corpo-
rate bonds. Thus, if a debt crisis entails a nancial crisis, the e¤ect on the economy
would be larger than the debt crisis without a nancial crisis. In the next subsection,
I will explore prior studies about these two relations. There is a vast literature of
studies of the relation between nancial and sovereign crises. Gennaioli et al. (2014a)
investigate 110 default episodes from 1980 to 2005 and report that 30 banking crises
occurred before defaults, 44 banking crises entailed sovereign defaults almost at the
same time as default and 36 defaults happened without banking crises. Borensztein
and Panizza (2008) point out that sovereign default is more likely to arouse a banking
crisis, considering 149 countriesdata between 1975 and 2000. They report that while
the unconditional probability of a banking crisis is 2.9%, the probability of the crisis
conditional on default jumps up to 14.1%3.
How, and how much, does sovereign default a¤ect nancial contraction? Gennaioli
et al. (2014b) nd that banks which hold a large proportion of sovereign bonds become
nancially fragile and reduce loans during sovereign crises. They analyze the role of
government bonds for 20,000 banks in 191 countries during times of default including
Russia in 1998, Argentina in 2001 and Greece in 2012. They report that 10% increase
in government bond holdings causes 3.6% cumulative decline of lending during the
rst two years of default due to deleveraging, preference for high risk sovereign bonds
and deciency of liquidity. Acharya et al. (2014) study four channels of the lending
contraction in the European debt crisis. The rst channel is balance sheet contraction.
The high sovereign credit risk damages banksbalance sheets, so these banks reduce
lending in order to satisfy their balance sheet constraints. The second channel is
bankshigh incentives to hold risky government bonds to obtain high returns. The
3They also report that the unconditional probability of a sovereign default is 2.2% and the proba-
bility of crisis conditional on a banking crisis is 4.5%.
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third channel is nancial repression. Governments obligate banks to possess their
bonds. The nal channel is the low value of government guarantees, which leads to
high nancing costs. The authors point out that the rst channel, i.e. balance sheets,
was the main cause of lending contraction and the second channel also a¤ected it.
Some papers study the e¤ects of sovereign premiums on the economy. Corsetti et
al. (2012) report that high sovereign risk increases borrowing costs to the private sector
and has an amplication e¤ect on cyclical shocks. Albertazzi et al. (2014) investigate
the behavior of Italian banks during the European sovereign crisis and estimate that
100 basis points of sovereign spread shock causes 70 basis points increase in the lending
interest rate and 0.7% point decrease in the growth rate of loans.
There are several papers that study the e¤ects of nancial contraction on the econ-
omy in sovereign debt crises. Acharya et al. (2014) found that rms depending on
banks in GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries reduced their
net debts and held more cash during the European debt crisis. In addition to this,
investment, sales growth and employment growth in nancially constrained rms are
lower than in less nancially constrained rms. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show that
country risk in emerging economies is one of the main factors of output volatility. They
estimate that if Argentina could eliminate its country risk, the output volatility would
be 27% lower than the actual volatility.
From these evidences, the nancial sector plays an important role in sovereign debt
crises. These crises can cause banking crises, and instability in the nancial sector
amplies an economic downturn. However, most defaults have happened in relatively
less nancially developed countries, so the analyses were restricted to these countries.
This suggests that if sovereign default happens in nancially developed economies,
the e¤ects of sovereign default entailing a banking crisis could be larger than in these
empirical results.
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2.3 Model
The framework of the model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium of a small
open economy, consisting of four domestic agents and one foreign agent: households,
goods producing rms, nancial intermediaries, the sovereign government and foreign
investors. The rst three agents are a continuum of unit measure. Households provide
labor for goods producing rms and receive wages from them. Goods producing rms
produce output goods from labor and sell them to households. Financial intermediaries
receive deposits from households, hold government bonds and lend working capital to
goods producing rms. The government is benevolent, maximizing the households
utility by two instruments: the decision to default or not and issuance of government
bonds. Foreign investors also hold government bonds. The rst graph of Appendix B.1
depicts the overall picture of the economy in the non-default state.
Default is in full for the government, so it does not need to repay its debts to
lenders at all. However, two penalties are imposed on the economy by the decision to
default4. The rst penalty is the governments non-access to the bond market. It cannot
issue any bonds and smooth householdsconsumption during the time of default. The
second penalty is nancial contraction. Government bonds become non-performing
and nancial intermediaries have to eliminate a part of these non-performing bonds
from their net worth. This decline in net worth causes contractions in nance and
output. The government in the default state has an opportunity to recover to the
non-default state with an exogenous stochastic probability at the end of every period.
In the case of recovery, the amounts of both debts and non-performing bonds are zero
at the beginning of the next period.
4Any damages to the economy will be penalties for the benevolent government.
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2.3.1 Households
Households are innitely lived and derive utility from consumption and disutility from
labor. Their total income consists of wages, interest revenue from deposits, dividends
from goods producing rms and nancial intermediaries and government transfers. In
terms of deposits, households lend them to nancial intermediaries and receive the
principal and interest within the period t, so the terms of deposits consist only of their
interest revenue. Thus, households cannot maximize inter-temporal householdsutility,
but the benevolent government maximizes their inter-temporal utility by adjusting the
transfers5.
The householdsutility maximization problem is
max
ct;Lt
E0
1X
t=0
tu(ct; Lt) (2.1)
s:t: ct = wtLt + r
ddt +t + Tt (2.2)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor of the household, ct is consumption, wt is the
wage rate, Lt is the labor supply, rd is the interest rate on deposit, dt is deposit, t
is dividends from goods producing rms and nancial intermediaries, Tt is government
transfers. The utility function u : R2+ ! R is continuous, twice di¤erential and satises
@u
@c
> 0; @
2u
@c2
< 0; @u
@L
< 0, @
2u
@L2
< 0 and @
2u
@c2
@2u
@L2
   @u
@c
@u
@L
2
> 0.
The rst-order condition of the householdsoptimization problem is
uLt + uctwt = 0 (2.3)
The equation represents the equality of the wage rate to the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between labor supply and consumption.
5This assumption is common in the endogenous sovereign default model (see Arellano (2008),
Mendoza and Yue (2012) and Perez (2015)).
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2.3.2 Goods Producing Firms
Goods producing rms maximize prots by producing output from labor and capital.
I assume the production technology follows the Cobb-Douglas function
yt = e
At(Ldt )
1 K (2.4)
where yt is output, At is total factor productivity, Ldt is labor input, K is the xed cap-
ital stock and  is the capital share of output. I assume the capital stock is exogenous
in order to reduce the number of state variables for simplicity6.
At follows the AR(1) process
At = At 1 + "t (2.5)
where  is the persistence of temporary TFP shock and "t  N(0; 2).
Firms need to borrow working capital kdt from nancial intermediaries in order
to pay wages to households before the commencement of production. They secure a
fraction  of working capital to wages in each period.
kdt = wtL
d
t (2.6)
More generally, this equation is held inequality since rms can borrow working
capital exceeding the necessary amount to nance wages. However, the excess amount
of working capital directly leads to a decrease in their prots, so the working capital
requirement always binds with equality. This working capital is repaid with its interest
6As Mendoza and Yue (2012) mention, capital accumulation is usually omitted in the sovereign
default model because empirical evidence justies this assumption. For example, Meza and Quintin
(2007) point out that the e¤ect of capital on the economy is limited during crises from their analyses in
Mexico and Argentina in 1994 and Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand in 1997. However, there are
several papers that include capital such as Gordon and Guerron-Quintana (2016) and Roldan-Pena
(2012).
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rkt within the period t. The prot maximization problem is
max
Ldt ;k
d
t
GPt = yt   wtLdt   rkt kdt (2.7)
The rst-order condition of goods producing rms with respect to the labor input
Ldt is
(1  )eAt(Ldt ) K = (1 + rkt )wt (2.8)
2.3.3 Financial Intermediaries
The market for nancial intermediaries is monopolistic competitive7. They possess
net worth n, receive deposits dt from households, lend working capital kst to goods
producing rms and hold government bonds at+1. I assume net worth n is constant
in the non-default state because nancial intermediaries do not keep their retained
earnings but allot all prots (including losses) to households which are the owners of
the nancial intermediaries8. However, when the government decides to default and
government bonds become non-performing, the net worth declines depending on the
amount of non-performing bonds. The characteristics of government bonds are one
period maturity, zero coupon and non-contingent. I assume the government forces
nancial intermediaries to hold a certain proportion of total bonds v. The explanation
of this assumption is in Appendix B.3. The amount of government bonds held by
nancial intermediaries at+1 is determined as follows
at+1 =  vbt+1 (2.9)
7De Bandt and Davis (2000) estimate the competitiveness of the banking sectors of some EU
countries by using H-statistics. They classify that large banks in Germany and France are monopolistic
competition and large and small banks in Italy are likely to be monopolistic competition. Similarly,
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) apply this estimation to the banking market in Latin American
countries and classify them also as monopolistic competition.
8In addition to this, although the method of nance is indi¤erent in the Modigliani-Miller theorem,
it is theoretically and empirically shown that issuing new equity is quite costly (See Stein (1998),
Diamond and Rajan (1999), Cornett and Tehranian (1994)). Thus, it would be a legitimate assumption
that nancial intermediaries do not acquire additional capital within the analysis of sovereign default.
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where bt+1 represents newly issued government bonds at time t. The value of govern-
ment bonds b is non-positive since bonds are a liability for the government. Foreign
investors hold the rest of government bonds  (1  v)bt+1 and set the price of govern-
ment bonds to qt 2
h
0; 1
1+rd
i
. Similarly, if the government is in the non-default state
at period t   1, the amount of government bonds held by nancial intermediaries at
the beginning period t is
at =  vbt (2.10)
In the case that the government regains the non-default state from the default state at
the end of period t  1, bt is zero and so is at.
If the government chooses default at time t, the government bonds bt become non-
performing, so nancial intermediaries have to eliminate the non-performing bonds
from their net worth. However, not all non-performing bonds inict damage upon
nancial intermediariesnet worth; an international nancial organization disburses a
certain fraction of the bonds in order to sustain the nancial system of the economy.
I assume the proportion of non-performing bonds that nancial intermediaries have
to eliminate, which is the haircut rate h for them, is determined exogenously and
the nancial organization accepts the burden of the rest of the non-performing bonds
(1   h)at at the time of default9. Thus, the amount of non-performing bonds that
nancial intermediaries have to eliminate znd;t is formulated as
znd;t = hat (2.11)
The subscript of non-performing bonds is nd because the government state is non-
default at the beginning of period t. The nancial intermediariesnet worth in the
default state ndt is
ndt = n  znd;t (2.12)
9Another interpretation of (1   h)at is that nancial intermediaries contract the insurance in the
case of government default.
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The nancial organization takes the burden of the remaining domestic non-performing
bonds (1   h)at. If the government is in the default state at the beginning of period
t, there is zd;t amount of non-performing bonds that is carried over from the previous
period t  1. Then, the non-performing bonds at the beginning of period t in the case
of the default state is
ndt = n  zd;t (2.13)
This net worth lowered by non-performing bonds continues until the government re-
gains the non-default state. The decrease in net worth a¤ects the contraction of nance
in three ways. First, nancial intermediaries are more likely to face the constraint of
a capital adequacy ratio. The proportion of net worth over risk-weighted assets has to
be larger than the minimum capital adequacy ratio. Thus, if it binds the capital ade-
quacy ratio, the decline in lending will be larger than in the non-binding case. Second,
because of the assumption that the lending cost increases as the amount of lending
deviates from a lending criterion and the lending criterion decreases as non-performing
bonds increase, nancial intermediaries have to pay additional costs on lending. Fi-
nally, nancial intermediaries have to acquire more deposits from households due to
the lower level of net worth in order to nance adequate lending of working capital.
The balance sheets of nancial intermediaries in both non-default and default cases
are in Table 2.1. In the non-default case, assets comprise from lending of working
capital kst and government bonds, and liabilities are deposits and net worth. In the
default state, nancial intermediaries do not hold government bonds, and their net
worth is the default state value ndt .
Table 2.1: Balance Sheet
(a) Non-Default Case (b) Default Case
kst dt
qtat+1 nt
kst dt
ndt
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Financial intermediaries face di¤erent prot maximization problems in the non-
default and default states. First, their prot maximization problem in the former state
is
max
kst ;dt
FIt = r
k
t k
s
t + at   qtat+1   rddt  	nd(kst ) (2.14)
where FIt is prots of nancial intermediaries and 	nd : R+ ! R+ is the lending cost
function which is twice continuously di¤erentiable. The interest rate on deposit dt is
the risk-free interest rate rd because of the zero probability of default risk of nancial
intermediaries, and the loan market decides the interest rate on working capital rkt .
Assets and liabilities in the balance sheet have to be equal as:
kst + qtat+1 = dt + n (2.15)
They also need to satisfy the capital adequacy ratio constraint. The ratio is dened as
net worth over the risk-weighted assets.
  nt
kst + qtat+1
(2.16)
where  is the minimum capital adequacy requirement and  is the risk-weight on
government bonds.
When the government is in the default state, nancial intermediaries solve the
di¤erent maximization problem under di¤erent constraints from the non-default state.
The nancial intermediariesprot maximization problem in the default state at time
t is
max
kst ;dt
FIt = r

t k
s
t   rddt  	d(kst ; zs;t) (2.17)
where 	d : R2+ ! R+ is the lending cost function in the default state which is twice
continuously di¤erentiable with respect to the rst argument.
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The balance sheet equation and capital adequacy constraint are as follows:
kst = dt + n
d
t (2.18)
  n
d
t
kst
(2.19)
The minimum capital adequacy ratio  does not change from the non-default case.
2.3.4 The Sovereign Government
The government is assumed to be benevolent, and its purpose is to maximize house-
holds lifetime utility by using two policies in the non-default state: the decision of
repayment or default s;t and the issuance of new bonds  bt+1. If the government is
in the default state, it has no policy to make. I assume that the government cannot
save for recession during good times, so the value of government bonds is non-positive.
In addition, the maximum amount of bonds that the government can issue is exoge-
nously given as bmax. Thus, the range of issuance of government bonds is dened as
 bt+1 2 [0; bmax]. After the realization of TFP, the government decides on repayment
or default by comparing non-default and default value functions. The governments
optimal default decision can be formulated as
V (At; bt; znd;t;mnd;t) = maxfV nd(At; bt;mnd;t); V d(At; znd;t;mnd;t)g (2.20)
where V nd and V d represent the governments values in the non-default and default
states respectively. The selection of V nd or V d denotes the governments policy of
repayment or default s 2 fnd; dg. There are two cases of the default value V d,
depending on whether the government is in the non-default or default state at the
beginning of period t. The government makes a decision on repayment or default s
in the state of non-default at the beginning of time t, so V d is the function of mnd;t in
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the equation (2.20).
First of all, the value function of government in the non-default state V nd is dened
as
V nd(At; bt;mnd;t) = maxfbt+1g
[(u(ct(At; bt;mnd;t)jnd;t; Lt(At; bt;mnd;t)jnd;t) (2.21)
+EtfV (At+1; bt+1; znd;t+1;mnd;t+1)j(At; bt;mnd;t; nd;t)]
The government chooses the optimal amount of transfer to households by issuing new
bonds  bt+1 in order to maximize households lifetime utility. The government can
choose the policy s every period, so the expected value in the next period is the
general function of V . The government faces the aggregate resource constraint of the
economy.
ct = yt   (1  v)(qtbt+1   bt) 	nd(kst ) (2.22)
The rst term of the right-hand-side is output, the second term is net payments of
government bonds for foreign investors and the nal term is the lending cost of nancial
intermediaries. Next, the government transfer is dened as
Tt =  qtbt+1 + bt (2.23)
The government controls the amount of transfers to households by issuance of new gov-
ernment bonds  bt+1. By combining the above two equations, the aggregate resource
constraint is
ct = yt + at   qtat+1  	nd(kst ) + Tt (2.24)
If the government chooses default in the case that the government is the non-default
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state at the beginning of period t, the default value function is
V d(At; znd;t;mnd;t) = u(ct(At; znd;t;mnd;t)jd;t; Lt(At; znd;t;mnd;t)jd;t) (2.25)
+(1  #)EtfV d(At+1; zd;t+1;md;t+1)j(At; znd;t;mnd;t; d;t)g
+#EtfV (At+1; 0; 0;mnd;t+1)j(At;mnd;t; d;t)g
There exists the amount of  bt government bonds before the default decision by
government, and nancial intermediaries have to incur the non-performing bonds fol-
lowing the haircut rule (2.11). If the default state continues to the next period t + 1
with the probability (1   #), non-performing bonds znd;t are carried over from time t
to the next period t + 1, zd;t+1. If the government regains the non-default state with
the probability # at the end of period t, the amount of government debts and non-
performing bonds will be zero at the beginning of next period t + 1. The government
constraint, which is equal to the aggregate constraint, in the default state is
ct = yt  	d(kst ; zs;t) (2.26)
The points of di¤erence from the non-default state are no transactions of government
bonds and transfers and the formulation of a lending cost function.
The default set  A is the set of TFP for the government bonds outstanding such
that the value of default is larger than the non-default value under the condition of
non-default state at the beginning of period t:
 A(bt;mnd;t) = fAt 2 A : V nd(At; bt;mnd;t)  V d(At; znd;t(bt);mnd;t)g (2.27)
The amount of non-performing bonds znd;t depends on the current bonds outstand-
ing bt because non-performing bonds are determined from the nancial intermediaries
government bond holding rule (2.10) and the haircut rule (2.11).
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The default probability et is dened as the conditional cumulative probability den-
sity over the transition of TFP from time t to t+ 1 within the range of the default set
 At .
e(At; bt+1;mnd;t+1) =
Z
 A(bt+1;mnd;t+1)
f(At+1; At)dAt+1 (2.28)
If the government is in the default state at the beginning of period t (i.e. ms = md),
the default value function is,
V d(At; zd;t;md;t) = u(ct(At; zd;t;md;t); Lt(At; zd;t;md;t)) (2.29)
+(1  #)EtfV d(At+1; zd;t+1;md;t+1)j(At; zd;t;md;t)g
+#EtfV (At+1; 0; 0;mnd;t+1)j(At;md;t)g
The amount of non-performing bonds zd;t is di¤erent from the amount if the government
chooses default during period t znd;t. However, the constraint is identical to that in the
previous case.
2.3.5 Foreign Investors and Government Bond Pricing
Foreign investors also undertake the rest of the government bonds that are not held by
nancial intermediaries (i.e.  bt+1  at+1) and price the government bonds qt. Foreign
investorsexpected prots are
Ft =  qt( bt+1   at+1) +
1  e(At; bt+1;mnd;t+1)
1 + rd
( bt+1   at+1) (2.30)
+
e(At; bt+1;mnd;t+1)
1 + rd
( bt+1   at+1)(1  h)
The rst term is the expenditure for the newly issued government bonds, and the
second and third terms are the expected return in the cases of non-default and default
respectively. Unlike in other endogenous sovereign default models, even though the
government chooses default, foreign investors can receive (1  h) times the amount of
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bond holdings from the international nancial organization. Besides, foreign investors
are risk neutral and behave perfectly competitively, so the price of government bonds
is derived from the rst-order condition with respect to  bt+1   at+1 as
qt(At; bt+1;mnd;t+1) =
1
1 + rd
f(1  e(At; bt+1;mnd;t+1)) + e(At; bt+1;mnd;t+1)(1  h)g
(2.31)
The price of government bonds reects the bailout from the nancial organization, and
that prevents drastic movement in its price. Domestic nancial intermediaries also
purchase the government bonds with the same price qt since the government bonds are
indi¤erent between domestic and foreign agents.
2.3.6 Competitive Equilibrium
I summarize the state vector as S 2 fA; b; zd;msg, where ms 2 fmnd;mdg indicates
the governments state of non-default or default at the beginning of time t.
Denition
The recursive equilibrium of this economy is dened as policy functions of the private
sector fc(S); L(S); Ld(S); kd(S); ks(S); d(S)g, value functions fV (A; b; znd;mnd;t),V nd(A; b;mnd),
V d(A; znd;mnd)g for government, government policies fb0(A; b;mnd); s(A; b;mnd)g, prices
fw(S); rk(S)g and the government bond pricing q(A; b0;m0nd) such that:
(1) Given the government policies and the price of government bond, the households
policies solve their utility maximization problem.
(2) Given the productivity, goods producing rms policies solve their prot
maximization problem.
(3) For (ms; s) = (mnd; nd):
Given the government policy of newly issuance of government bonds, the amount
of current bond and the price of government bond, a(b) and a0(b0) satisfy nancial
intermediariesgovernment bond holding rules at time t (2.10) and at time
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t+1 (2.9), and the nancial intermediaries policies solve the non-default states
prot maximization problem of nancial intermediaries in (2.14) (2.16).
For (ms; s) = (mnd; d):
Given the amount of current bond, a(b), znd;t(b) and ndt (b) satisfy the rules
(2.10), (2.11) and (2.12), and the nancial intermediaries policies solve the
default states prot maximization problem of nancial intermediaries in
(2.17) (2.19).
For ms = md:
Given the non-performing bonds carried over from previous period zd, ndt (b)
satises the rule (2.13), and the nancial intermediaries policies solve the
default states prot maximization problem of nancial intermediaries in
(2.17) (2.19).
(4) The working capital and labor markets clear:
ks(S) = kd(S) (2.32)
L(S) = Ld(S) (2.33)
(5) For ms = mnd:
Given the amount of current bond and the price of government bond, the
government policies solve its optimization problem and the government transfer
satises equation (2.23).
(6) The plan of consumption satises the aggregate resource constraint (2.24) in
the normal state and (2.26) in the default state.
(7) For (ms; s) = (mnd; nd):
Given the default set  A(b;mnd) and the default probability e(A; b0;m0nd;),
the price of government bonds satises the foreign investorsgovernment bond
pricing equation (2.31).
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Explanation
Condition (1) and (2) require householdsand goods producing rmsoptimization
problems respectively. Condition (3) requires decision rules of nancial intermediaries
government bonds holding and non-performing bonds and nancial intermediariesop-
timization problems divided into three cases: the non-default state at the beginning of
time t and the governments choice of repayment, the non-default state at the beginning
of time t and the governments choice of default and the default state at the beginning
of period t. Condition (4) requires the market clearing of working capital and labor.
Condition (5) requires the governments optimization problem in the non-default state.
Condition (6) requires the aggregate constraint in each state of the economy. Condition
(7) requires the determination of the price of government bonds.
2.3.7 Timing
The overview of time ow around time t is depicted in the second graph of Appendix
B.1. I divide timelines into the non-default and default states.
The Timeline of the Non-Default State
At the beginning of period t, the government owes the amount of  bt debts (if it
regains the non-default state from the default state,  bt is zero). First of all, TFP is
revealed. Then, the government makes the decision to either repay or default. If it
chooses the former, foreign investors and domestic nancial intermediaries receive the
full amount of repayments and the government issues new bonds  bt+1 priced by qt.
Afterwards, nancial intermediaries borrow deposits from households and lend working
capital to goods producing rms. The market determines the interest rate for working
capital. Households provide labor force to goods producing rms and receive wages.
The wage rate is determined by the labor market. Then, the rms produce output
goods and repay working capital with interest to nancial intermediaries. Households
purchase output goods, receive government transfers and deposit with interest and
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nally consume. Time t ends here and goes to next time t+ 1. If the government had
chosen default after the realization of TFP, the timeline goes to the default state.
The Timeline of the Default State
There are two initial points in the default state timeline: continuing default state
and governments default decision during time t. If the default state continues from
the previous period, there are zd;t amount of non-performing bonds, which are carried
over from time t  1. Then, the TFP is revealed. If the government in the non-default
state chooses default after the TFP is revealed, the timeline shifts to the default state
with non-performing bonds znd;t, which is equivalent to ( bt v h). Subsequently, each
agent transacts goods and households consume similarly to in the non-default state
case. Finally, nature decides to regain the non-default state or not with exogenous
probability #. If the government does not recover the non-default state, the non-
performing bonds zs;t are carried over to the next period t+ 1.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
This section provides the quantitative analysis based on the calibration for the Argen-
tinean economy. The biggest reason for my selection of the Argentinean default for the
calibration is that the country had a relatively well-established nancial system, among
the countries which experienced default. The Argentinean case was one of the biggest
defaults in history before the Greek default, and a banking crisis had also happened10.
In my model, the nancial system is essential to generate the amplication mechanism
of default, so Argentina was considered appropriate for the analysis of the nancial
amplication e¤ect by default. Of course, the default in Greece was huge and a bank-
ing crisis also broke out. However, as I explain in the next chapter, the endogenous
sovereign default model cannot be applicable to the analysis of a country which accu-
10See Gennaioli et al. (2014a).
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mulates massive public debts, such as 170% of debt-to-GDP ratio in Greece11. Another
reason for my choice of Argentina is that this countrys default is often discussed in
analyzing sovereign default, so it is easy to compare with prior research12.
After explaining the calibration and functional forms, I report the cyclical co-
movements of the model, focusing on the explanation of nancial variables, values
functions and government bond pricing. Finally, I show the simulation results of base-
line and alternative scenarios. I also provide results of changing the parameters related
to non-performing bonds and the amount of maximum debt.
2.4.1 Calibration and Functional Forms
Following Greenwood et al. (1988), I specify the utility function as
u(ct; Lt) =
(ct   1!L!t )1 
1   (2.34)
where  is the degree of risk aversion and ! is the elasticity of labor supply. I assume
this function to eliminate the wealth e¤ect on the labor supply, so the labor supply
depends only on the wage rate. I set  and ! to 2 and 1.455 respectively from the
standard value of the RBC model. Following Mendoza and Yue (2012), I set the
households discount factor  to 0:8813, and the persistence of transitory TFP shock
 and the standard deviation of the shock  to 0:95 and 0:017 respectively. I set the
capital share of output  and the risk free interest rate on deposit rd to 0.36 and
0.02 respectively, which are common values used in the RBC model. Under the Basel
Accord, banks are required to hold no less than 8% of net worth proportional to risk-
11Data source is OECD.
12For example, canonical papers that calibrate the Argentinean economy are Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), Arellano (2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2012).
13This value is lower than the standard RBC model. This is because if it takes a higher value, the
government will not choose default in order to relieve the burden of its debts in the rst place. The
one way to interpret this low value is that the government can be regarded as less patient for political
reasons. Other papers also set low values on the discount factor. For example, Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) and Perez (2015) set to 0.8 and 0.9 respectively.
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weighted assets. However, because the Argentinean banking system is more volatile
than those of other advanced countries, the Central Bank of Argentina sets its original
minimum capital adequacy ratio to 11.5% ( = 0:115). Next, I set the risk weight on
government bonds  to 0 because the value is zero for domestic bond holders under the
current Basel regulation. I assume the nancial intermediarieslending cost function
in the non-default and default states as the following quadratic forms,
	nd(k
s
t ) = nd;1k
s
t +
2
2
n
kst  

n
Arg
  qtat+1
o2
ks
(2.35)
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d;1k
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  3
o2
ks
(2.36)
where nd;1, d;1, 2 and 3 are parameters taking positive values. The parameters
nd;1, d;1 are the base premium on lending of working capital in the non-default and
default state respectively, 2=k
s is the elasticity of lending normalized by the steady
state lending of working capital and 3 is the extra penalty on lending in the default
state. The rst term in each function represents the simple linear relation of lend-
ing and its cost, and the second term indicates the quadratically increasing cost as
the amount of lending deviates from the lending criterion. I set the lending criteria
to

n
Arg
  qtat+1

in the non-default case and

ndt
Arg
  3

in the default case. As
the amount of lending moves from these criteria, nancial intermediaries have to pay
additional lending costs. The criterion in the non-default state is net worth over the
Argentinean capital adequacy ratio minus risk-weighted government bonds, and the
criterion in the default case is net worth lowered by non-performing bonds over the Ar-
gentinean capital adequacy ratio minus the extra penalty 3
14. I explain the economic
14Gerali et al. (2010) assume a similar function that increases costs quadratically as the capital to
assets ratio deviates from the exogenous xed value. As they point out the quadratic cost function
is ad hoc and is not established from the microfoundation, but they show the reconciliation of their
model with the euro area economy. Several papers also assume the similar a la Rotemberg (1982)
quadratic cost function. For example, Iacoviello (2015) adopts adjustment cost functions on deposits
and loans, and Dib (2010) also applies the adjustment cost on capital and deposit interest rates.
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interpretation of the lending cost function by deriving the rst-order conditions in Ap-
pendix B.4. I set the parameter nd;1 to 0.02, which is considered to be a reasonable
risk premium on lending in the non-default state. I set the capital adequacy ratio of
nancial intermediaries Arg to 14.6% from the data in December 1996 before the Ar-
gentinean economic downturn started15. Next, according to Dias and Richmond (2008),
it takes 5.7 years on average to regain partial market access after default16. Thus, I
set the probability of recovery to the non-default state # to 0.044 per quarter17. In
terms of the proportion of domestic agentsgovernment bond holdings, Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2006) estimate that domestic agents hold 60% of total defaulted debt,
but according to the data from Shapiro and Pham (2006), about 41.5% of government
debts were held by domestic agents in 2001. Thus, I set the proportion of domestic
bond holdings v to 0.5 as a benchmark and examine di¤erent values in the section
on alternative scenarios. Next, it is extremely di¢ cult to calibrate parameters for the
haircut rate h because the Argentinean government implemented the debt swaps or
reductions not only one time but ve times and the rate varied in each restructuring,
and moreover the reduction rates for each kind of bonds were also di¤erent. Accord-
ing to Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), the average haircut rates were 7175% at
the main debt restructuring in 2005. However, the government granted GDPindexed
warrants equivalent to 2 cents on one dollar, but the value increased signicantly due
to the high recovery of the Argentinean economy after the default. Thus, I set the
haircut rate h to 0.6 as a benchmark and also examine other values in the alternative
scenarios section. A detailed explanation of the debt restructuring in Argentina is in
Appendix B.5.
15See International Monetary Fund (1998).
16Dias and Richmond (2007) dene the partial market access as "the rst year in which there are
positive net bond and bank transfers to the public or private sector" and full market access as "the
rst year of positive net bond and bank transfers to the private or public sector greater than 1.0% of
GDP."
17Some other sovereign default models such as Mendoza and Yue (2012), Perez (2015) set # to 0.083.
They refer to the median duration to regain partial market access.
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Table 2.2: Calibration
Parameter Value Target/Source
: Degree of risk aversion 2 Standard Value
!: Elasticity of labor supply 1.455 Standard Value
: Discount factor 0.88 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
: Persistence of transitory TFP shock 0.95 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
: Standard deviation of TFP shock 0.017 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
: Capital share of output 0.36 Standard Value
rd: Riskfree interest rate 0.02 Standard Value
: Minimum capital adequacy requirement 0.115 Regulation in Argentina
: Risk weight on government bonds 0.0 Basel Regulation
nd;1: Base premium on lending in non-default 0.02 Standard Value
Arg: Argentinas capital adequacy ratio 0.146 Average of Argentinean Banks
#: Probability of the recovery to non-default 0.044 Dias and Richmond (2008)
v: Proportion of domestic bond holdings 0.5 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) and Data
h: Haircut rate 0.6 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006)
calibrated
K: Fixed capital stock 5.4 E[K=y]  2:7
 : Ratio of working capital to wages 2.7 E[wL=yg  0:57
n: Net worth in the non-default case 0.5 E[r]  0:025
2=k
s: Lending elasticity to its interest rate 0.07 rjA=0:05  0:025 0:01
bmax: Maximum debt -0.7 Decline of net worth by default 0:35
d;1: Base premium on lending in default 0.035 E[r

d ]  0:11
3: Extra nancial penalty by default 0.8 r
jB=0:35  0:11 0:03
Then, I jointly calibrate the xed capital stock K, the ratio of working capital to
wages , net worth in the non-default case n, and lending elasticity to the interest rate
2=k
s by targeting moments of the expected capital-to-GDP ratio, labor income-to-
GDP ratio, lending interest rates under neutral TFP, and deviation of lending interest
rates under 5% lower and higher than the TFP level. According to the estimation by
Coremberg et al. (2007), the capital-to-GDP ratio from 1980 to 2001 in Argentina was
about 2.7. Labor income share in GDP was about 57% in 2000 (Frankema (2010)).
The expected lending interest rate is set to be slightly higher than the risk-free interest
rate at 2:5% and to change 1% points under the condition of 5% variation of TFP
from the neutral level. From these targeted moments, I obtain K = 5:4,  = 2:7,
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n = 0:518 and 2=k
s
t = 0:07.
In addition to this, I separately calibrate parameters related to the default state:
the maximum debt amount bmax, the base premium on lending in the default state d;1
and the additional nancial penalty due to the governments decision to default 3 by
targeting net worth decline by default, the average working capital interest rate in the
default state and interest rate deviation by the debt outstanding. Net worth of nancial
intermediaries shifted relatively constant before the default, but decreased about 35%
after default due to the devaluation of Argentinean peso19. Next, the average interest
rate in the default state was about 11% after the Argentinean default in 2002, and the
rate changes 3% points if the amount of bonds changes to 0:35. From these three
targeted values, I obtain bmax =  0:7, d;1 = 0:035 and 3 = 0:8. Table 2.2 summarizes
values of all parameters.
2.4.2 Cyclical Co-movements of the Model
The decrease of net worth is the one of the main channels to amplify the e¤ect of
sovereign default in my model. If the government chooses to default, its bonds be-
come non-performing and nancial intermediaries have to eliminate a part of the non-
performing bonds from their net worth. Because the lending of working capital and
its interest rates depend on net worth, the nancial contraction is contingent on the
amount of non-performing bonds in the default state. The left panel of Figure 2.1
shows the relation between non-performing bonds and the lending interest rate under
di¤erent levels of TFP and government states. As TFP and non-performing bonds are
higher, the interest rate in the default state increases. Obviously, the interest rate in
18The value of net worth in my model is higher than in the data. I assume all rms need working
capital to acquire labor force, but rms which have enough net worth do not need borrow money from
nancial intermediaries in the actual economy. Taking their net worth into account, the amount of
net worth in the economy will be larger than only nancial intermediariesnet worth.
19I normalize the net worth based on the real e¤ective exchange rate. I obtained the net worth data
from the Central Bank of Argentina and real e¤ective exchange rates from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis.
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Figure 2.1: Interest Rate and Lending
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Note: High, middle and low represent the TFP values of -10%, 0% and 10% deviation from the steady state level respectively,
and D and ND indicate default and non-default states respectively.
the non-default state does not depend on non-performing bonds. The interest rate in
the default state is higher than in the non-default state under the same TFP level. For
example, in the neutral TFP case, while the interest rate in the case of the non-default
state is about 2.5%, that of the default state is about 8% at zero non-performing bonds
and 14% at the maximum amount of non-performing bonds. The right graph shows
the relation between non-performing bonds and the lending of working capital under
the same conditions as the previous graph. Lending in the default state increases as the
level of TFP is higher and non-performing bonds are lower. In the neutral TFP case,
the amount of lending in the default state under maximum and zero non-performing
bonds is about 40% and 20% lower than that of lending in the non-default state re-
spectively.
Next, Figure 2.2 depicts the value functions of default and non-default states in four
di¤erent TFP cases. The horizontal axis of the default value function represents the
amount of debts at the time of default, so the scales correspond to the non-performing
bonds following equations (2.10) and (2.11). Other endogenous sovereign default mod-
els assume that the default value function depends only on TFP or endowment and
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Figure 2.2: Value Function
(b) Steady State TFP (b) -5 TFP
-0.7 -0.56 -0.42 -0.28 -0.14 0
-8.7
-8.6
-8.5
-8.4
-8.3
-8.2
-8.1
-8
-7.9
Debt
Non-Def ault
Def ault
-0.7 -0.56 -0.42 -0.28 -0.14 0
-9.4
-9.2
-9
-8.8
-8.6
-8.4
Debt
(c) -10% TFP (d) -15% TFP
-0.7 -0.56 -0.42 -0.28 -0.14 0
-9.8
-9.6
-9.4
-9.2
-9
-8.8
Debt
-0.7 -0.56 -0.42 -0.28 -0.14 0
-10.8
-10.6
-10.4
-10.2
-10
-9.8
-9.6
Debt
Note: Debt in the horizontal axis corresponds to non-performing bonds in the default value functions.
The value of non-performing bonds is derived from equations (2.10) and (2.11).
non-performing bonds do not a¤ect the default value function. Thus, default can hap-
pen in most TFP or endowment cases if the government accumulates massive debts.
However, in my model, not only the non-default value function but also the default
value is decreasing the amount of debts. In the cases of steady state level and -5% lower
than steady state TFP, the non-default value function is always higher than the default
value function regardless of the amount of government bonds, so the government does
not choose default at all, and the price of government bonds is equal to the value at
zero default probability. However, as TFP takes lowers values, the distance between
default and non-default values is closer, and the default value exceeds the non-default
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value in the case of -15% TFP if debts exceed the threshold. The pace of decline in the
non-default value becomes steep because the price of government bonds decreases due
to the possibility of occurrence of default. If the price of government bonds declines,
the government cannot transfer enough to households by the issuance of its bonds.
Thus, the amount of government transfer to households dened in equation (2.22) will
decline and could be negative. Then, the amount of consumption declines and so does
householdsutility.
The left panel of Figure 2.3 represents the default set depending on TFP and
government debts. Default only happens under the condition of low TFP and high
debt20. The important feature is that the default area does not exist if the TFP is
larger than about -10% because the non-default value function is always higher than
the default value function. The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows government bond
prices depending on the TFP and government debts. In the case of low TFP and high
government debt, the probability of default is high so foreign investors set a low price
on government bonds following the bond pricing equation (2.31). Even though the
probability of default is almost certain, the price does not fall below 0.4 because the
international nancial organization guarantees the repayment of  (1  h)bt+1 debts to
nancial intermediaries and foreign investors, and foreign investors know the nancial
organizations behavior at the time of their pricing of the government bonds. The
price of government bonds shows quite drastic movement because as Arellano (2008)
points out, the region of the government debts that the investors account for in the
default premium (i.e. the default probability is between zero and one) is limited in the
endogenous sovereign default model.
20Aguiar and Amador (2013) point out that although default usually happens in bad times, more
than one-third of defaults occurred when income was above the trend.
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Figure 2.3: Default Set and Government Bond Prices
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2.5 Simulation Results
I simulate the model to obtain statistical properties to analyze sovereign debt default.
I generate stochastic TFP processes 2000 times for 500 periods and trace the movement
of variables. The government starts from the non-default state, and the initial values
of TFP and government bonds are neutral and zero respectively, but I discard the rst
100 periods in order to eliminate the e¤ect of these initial conditions.
2.5.1 Baseline Results
First of all, I explain the data source and period. The average debt-to-GDP ratio is
taken from the historical public debt database of the IMF Fiscal A¤airs Department
for 19932000. In terms of default frequency, Argentina had experienced six defaults
since 1820, so the default frequency per quarter is about 0.77%. The data source for the
average bond spread is J.P. Morgans EMBI+ spread on foreign currency dominated
Argentinean bonds from 199821 to 2016 excluding the time of debt crisis from 2002 to
2005. I set this time span for the crisis because the government defaulted in December
2001 and implemented its rst debt restructuring after the default in 2005. The GDP
21I start from 1998 due to the limitation of data.
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data is from OECD, consumption and the interest rate on lending data are from IMFs
International Financial Statistics and lending data is from the Central Bank of Ar-
gentina. Detailed explanations are in Appendix B.7. In my model, I remove the datas
trend e¤ect of output, consumption and lending from the original data by using the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter22. Then, I calculate the correlation coe¢ cient and e¤ects
of sovereign default for the sample period from 1999Q1 to 2005Q1.
Table 2.3 summarizes the main results of the actual Argentinean economys data
and baseline simulation. The average debt-to-GDP ratio in simulation (37.06%) obtains
a similar value to the data (33.13%), although other papers usually report lower values
on the debt-to-GDP ratio23. Next, the frequencies of default in the data and the
simulation are 0.77% and 0.71% respectively. Although the default frequency in the
data is taken from the long history and it is controversial to judge that the actual
default frequency is 0.77%, it is an intuitively acceptable value that default happens
one time in about 35 years derived from 0.71% default probability per quarter. The
simulation result for the average bond spread reports a lower value than the data. This
is because while the bond spread in the data takes a constantly high value24 as the
country risk, in simulation it is zero under the zero default probability state and the
bond spread jumps up only in the case that investors take into account the possibility
of default.
The coe¢ cient correlations between output and consumption in the data and the
simulation are 0.960 and 0.990 respectively, so their movements around the default
period are quite similar in both the data and the simulation. The relation between
output and lending is not strong in the data. This suggests that other factors also
a¤ected the contraction of output25. However, in my simulation, output depends on
22The smoothing parameter is 1600.
23For example, Arellano (2008), Mendoza and Yue (2012) and Perez (2015) report the debt-to-GDP
ratio at about 6%, 23% and 22% respectively.
24The average bond spread is 1.76% from 2006 to 2016.
25For example, Mendoza and Yue (2012) assume that nal goods producing rms cannot import
intermediate goods from foreign countries in the default state.
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Table 2.3: Simulation Results
Data Baseline
Average Debt/GDP 37.06% 33.13%
Default Frequency 0.77% 0.71%
Average Bond Spread 1.92% 0.19%
The correlation with Output
Consumption 0.960 0.990
Lending 0.662 0.988
Interest rate on lending -0.740 -0.932
The Default E¤ect on Variables
Output -10.56% -16.15%
Consumption -17.31% -16.34%
Lending -27.94% -26.44%
Interest rate on lending 17.50% 9.76%
Note 1: The values of output, consumption and lending show the deviation from trend.
Note 2: The default e¤ect on variables indicates values that show the most extreme
e¤ect around the default period.
Note 3: The average bond spread is on a quarterly basis.
lending and TFP, so the relation between output and lending is very high. Output and
interest rate on lending in both data and simulation are negatively related. Finally,
I summarize the default e¤ects on the main four variables in the last section of the
table. The baseline simulation results of contractions of consumption and lending are
similar to the data, but the baseline results overestimate output and underestimate the
interest rate on lending.
Figure 2.4 shows the transition of main variables around the default period. In the
horizontal axis, year zero represents the time of default and the values of scale are years
before and after the default. Figure 2.4 (a) describes the interest rate on lending. The
interest rate in the data shifted between 2 and 4% until one year before the default,
but the rate sharply increased due to increased uncertainty around debt sustainability.
The interest rate hit a maximum value of 17.5% half a year after the default, and then
the rate gradually fell and recovered to the pre-default level one and half years after
default. In my simulation, the interest rate is almost constant at around 2% before the
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Figure 2.4: Default E¤ects on Main Variables
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Note 1: Year zero is set to 2002Q1.
Note 2: The values of output, consumption and lending show the deviation from trend.
Note 3: The lending interest rate is on a quarterly basis.
Note 4: The bar graph in Figure (d) represents contributions to the change in consumption.
default, but the interest rate jumps up to about 10% at the time of default and in the
next quarter. Then, the rate begins to decrease but it takes time to converge to the
pre-default level.
Figure 2.4 (b) shows the amount of lending. The lending in the data had started to
decline about half a year before the default and dropped sharply at the time of default.
Then, the rate stayed at a low level for about two years before beginning to recover
quickly. The lending in my simulation keeps shifting above the trend just before the
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default and hit the bottom at the time of default, reaching about 26% of decline. Then,
it gradually recovers and becomes positive in two years.
Figure 2.4 (c) depicts the GDPmovement. GDP in the data fell below the trend half
a year before the default and reached 10.56% below trend at the time of default. The
rate stayed around -10% for three quarters and then started to increase and regained
a positive value three years after the default. GDP in the simulation drops 16% from
the trend at the time of default but begins to recover soon and becomes positive in
two years. GDP and lending are closely related in my simulation.
Finally, Figure 2.4 (d) reports the transition of consumption. The consumption in
the data and the simulation show similar movement. In the data, consumption started
to decline three quarters before default and hit the bottom half a year after default.
Then, it gradually recovered and regained a positive value about two years after de-
fault26. In my simulation, consumption is composed of output, prots from goods pro-
ducing rms and nancial intermediaries and government transfers, so I can separately
derive their contributions to consumption. The biggest contributor to consumption is
output, and it determines most of the uctuation in consumption. However, transfers
also a¤ect its movement, especially before the default, and pushing down consumption
to almost zero percent. This is because as the amount of debt becomes higher, foreign
investors take into account the possibility of default and the price of government bonds
declines. Thus, the amount of transfers contributes to consumption negatively before
the default.
2.5.2 Alternative Scenarios
In this section, I examine two alternative scenarios: the nancial intermediariesbur-
den of non-performing bonds and maximum amount of issuance of government bonds.
26The reason why consumption jumped up and lending dropped two years after the default in the
actual Argentinean economy is high ination. Because of the increase in demand for natural gas, the
GDP deatior increased 22.7% in 2004Q1 from the previous quarter. Although I subtract the e¤ect
of ination from nominal consumption and lending, it is hard to obtain the true real values.
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I report changing haircut rates (h) and the proportion of government bonds held do-
mestically (v) as the rst alternative scenario because these variables are related to the
non-performing bonds which are the main cause of the nancial amplication mecha-
nism. The second half is the case that the government can issue more bonds than the
baseline case. This feature creates the phenomenon as "Too-Big-to-Default", meaning
the government cannot choose default by itself when it accumulates too much debt.
Non-Performing Bonds
Table 2.4: Simulation Results: Alternative Scenarios
Baseline Haircut Rate Domestic Bond Holding
h = 0:48 h = 0:72 v = 0:45 v = 0:55
Average Debt/GDP 33.13% 29.32% 34.85% 28.83% 34.87%
Default Frequency 0.71% 1.29% 0.32% 1.05% 0.27%
Average Bond Spread 0.19% 0.28% 0.06% 0.35% 0.05%
The correlation with Output
Consumption 0.990 0.994 0.989 0.994 0.991
Lending 0.988 0993 0.983 0.994 0.987
Interest rate on lending -0.932 -0.954 -0.906 -0.957 -0.915
The Default E¤ect on Variables
Output -16.15% -14.55% -18.94% -14.33% -18.96%
Consumption -16.34% -14.76% -19.59% -14.47% -19.55%
Lending -26.44% -23.79% -30.92% -23.40% -30.90%
Interest rate on lending 9.76% 9.29% 10.97% 9.19% 10.71%
Note: The haircut rate and nancial intermediariesbonds holding in the baseline case are 0.6 and 0.4 respectively.
Table 2.4 shows the simulation results under di¤erent values for the haircut rate and
the proportion of government bonds held by domestic nancial intermediaries. First
of all, when the haircut rate is 20% smaller than the baseline case of 60%, declines
in output, consumption and lending are about 2.7%, 2.6% and 3.5% smaller than
the baseline because nancial intermediaries are burdened with less non-performing
bonds. This weak e¤ect of default on the economy leads to a higher incentive for
the government to choose default, so the frequency of default changes from 0.67% to
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1.29%. Also, the average debt-to-GDP ratio declines from 33.2% to 29.3% since the
government will choose default with a relatively lower level of debt, and the average
bond spread increases from 0.16% to 0.28% since the risk of default appears more
frequent as the government chooses default more. The case of the higher haircut rate
shows opposite e¤ects on the economy. The domestic nancial intermediaries need to
eliminate more non-performing bonds, so the damage on the economy is more severe
than in the baseline case. Thus, the government is less willing to choose default, and
that leads to higher average debt-to-GDP and lower bond spread.
Next, the change in the proportion of nancial intermediariesgovernment bond
holdings inuences the economy similar to the change in the haircut rate. In the case
of lower domestic bond holdings, nancial intermediaries are burdened with a smaller
amount of non-performing bonds. Thus, the damage on the economy is milder and the
government will choose default more. Also, the average debt-to-GDP ratio decreases
and bond spread increases.
Table 2.5: Simulation Results: Various Scenarios
vh 0.36 0.48 0.6 0.72 0.84
0.35 (1.51, -9.72) (1.07, -11.27) (0.87, -12.24) (0.85, -12.71) (0.80, -13.26)
0.40 (1.57, -11.00) (1.28, -11.96) (1.19, -12.97) (0.98, -14.05) (0.60, -14.66)
0.45 (1.70, -11.53) (1.43, -12.88) (1.05. -14.33) (0.74, -15.99) (0.49, -17.67)
0.5 (1.57, -12.64) (1.29, -14.55) (0.67, -17.20) (0.32, -18.94) (nan, nan)
0.55 (1.25, -13.93) (0.85, -16.52) (0.27, -18.96) (nan, nan) (nan, nan)
0.60 (0.85, -15.32) (0.27, -18.46) (nan, nan) (nan, nan) (nan, nan)
0.65 (0.37, -16.90) (nan, nan) (nan, nan) (nan, nan) (nan, nan)
Note 1: The rst and second elements in each set of parentheses represent the default frequency
and the decline in output from the trend respectively.
Note 2: "nan" represents no occurrence of default.
Table 2.5 summarizes the various combinations of both parameters, the proportion
of nancial intermediaries government bond holdings v and the haircut rate h, re-
porting on the frequency of default (the rst element) and output decline (the second
element). The frequency of default is monotonic in inverse relation with the hair-
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cut rate, but its relation with the proportion of domestic government holdings is not
monotonic. The reason for the former monotonic relation is quite straightforward be-
cause the nancial intermediaries have to eliminate more non-performing bonds as the
haircut rate increases. However, as equation (2.22) shows, the lower proportion of
government bond holdings by domestic agents means a higher outow of goods by
issuance of government bonds. Thus, the government becomes more conservative to
accumulating debts, so these two e¤ects lead to a nonlinear relation between the fre-
quency of default and the proportion of domestic government bond holdings. If both
values are high, the government does not choose default at all because the damage
on the economy is too strong to choose default. Next, the default e¤ect on output
sees a monotonic decrease as the values of these two parameters increase. This result
is consistent with our intuition because as the amount of non-performing bonds that
nancial intermediaries have to eliminate increases, the contractions of lending and
output are larger due to the governments decision to default.
Too-Big-to-Default
Next, I examine the case that the government issues its bonds twice as high as the
baseline case, 0.7. Figure 2.5 (a) shows the default and non-default value functions
under the condition of 10% lower than neutral TFP. The non-default value is higher
than the default value in the case of a low debt amount (from -0.38 to 0) and the
default value exceeds the non-default value in the middle level of issuance of debt
(from -1.27 to 0.38). However, the non-default value exceeds the default value again
around the maximum debt region (from -1.4 to -1.27). This is because while the default
value function is quadratically decreasing, the non-default value is not a monotonously
decreasing function. The former e¤ect comes from the characteristics of the lending
cost function (2.36). The amount of non-performing bonds that the government has to
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Figure 2.5: High Maximum Debt Amount
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eliminate increases quadratically as the government accumulates debts, so the damage
on the economy from the default is larger if the government issues more bonds. The
latter e¤ect comes from the increase in the price of government bonds. When the
default value function decreases and the value becomes closer to the non-default value
function, or the default value falls below the non-default value, the government is
less likely to choose default and the price of government bonds increases. Thus, the
government can transfer more to households, and the decrease in householdsutility is
mitigated.
Figure 2.5 (b) and 2.5 (c) show this phenomenon. The non-default area expands
and the price of government bonds increases around the high debt amount. This
phenomenon can be expressed as "Too-Big-to-Default". If the government accumulates
massive debts, it cannot choose default by itself because of the huge e¤ect on the
economy. This would be a part of the reason why defaults do not happen frequently in
developed countries, and this result implies that the endogenous default model might
be inappropriate to use to analyze a country where a government accumulates massive
debts.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous sovereign
default incorporating nancial intermediaries. The government selects default or re-
payment by comparing values of default and non-default. If the government chooses
default, its bonds become non-performing and the net worth of nancial intermediaries
is reduced by eliminating these non-performing bonds. This leads to contraction in
lending and output. I calibrate the Argentinean economy around its default in 2001 in
order to explore the mechanism of nancial amplication by sovereign default.
My main contributions can be summarized two points. First, while other papers
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simplify the government value of default depending only on TFP or endowments, the
default value in my model is contingent outstanding government debts in the non-
default state. Thus, as the government issues more bonds, nancial intermediaries
have to eliminate more non-performing bonds from their net worth in the default state.
This feature allows us to examine the nancial amplication e¤ect on the economy by
changing some important parameters such as the haircut rate and the proportion of
government bonds held by domestic agents. Besides, the model explains the phenom-
enon of "Too-Big-to-Default". It shows that the government will not be able to choose
default by itself when it accumulates too much debt. Second, the compatibility of my
model to the default in Argentina in 2001 is relatively sound, capturing moments of
important variables and frequency of default.
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Chapter 3
A General Equilibrium Model of
Sovereign Debt Crisis in an
Advanced Country
3.1 Introduction
The recent European sovereign debt crisis awakened the idea that the occurrence of
debt crises was not restricted to developing countries. After the revelation of the Greek
governments manipulation of its nancial decit in 2009, investors became skeptical to-
ward the scal sustainability of European countries, especially Portugal, Italy, Ireland,
Greece and Spain. The credit default swap (CDS) rate in these countries increased
signicantly around the time that the Greek government virtually defaulted in 2012.
Although the IMF, ECB and European Commission (the so-called Troika) and the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) attempted to stabilize the crisis, mainly by in-
jecting bailouts to governments and banking sectors in these countries, the crisis caused
serious contractions, decreasing real GDP by about 26.5% in Greece, 8.9% in Spain,
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8.7% in Italy, 7.9% in Ireland and 7.9% in Portugal1. The huge impact of sovereign
debt crisis on the economy became apparent.
According to a recent report in the IMF Fiscal Monitor, average debt in advanced
countries is projected to remain high, shifting to over 70% of the GDP ratio in the
near future. The main cause of this high debt projection is that governments which
have generous social welfare systems cannot reduce their social security expenditure
easily due to the aging society. Although debt crises are triggered not only by the
debt-to-GDP ratio but also by many other factors, the ratio is one of the indisputably
signicant causes of crises. As long as the debt level is expected to be high, it is
important to have tools to analyze sovereign debt crises and quantify their e¤ects on
the economy.
When a government faces a sovereign debt problem, it had been usually chosen
default or restructuring as a method to reduce the burden of huge debts. The most au-
thoritative model to analyze sovereign debt default is the endogenous sovereign default
which was introduced by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). The model assumes a govern-
ments willingness rather than the ability to pay debt. In other words, if the value of
default is larger than that of non-default, the government chooses to default. However,
it is hardly considered that this mechanism can be applicable to advanced economies
or at least to the debt crisis in Europe for the following reasons. First of all, the Euro-
pean debt crisis case does not satisfy the two presuppositions of the endogenous default
model: that the government can estimate the e¤ect of the default precisely and that
its e¤ect on the economy has to be small and short. Otherwise, the government cannot
compare values of default and non-default and would not choose default in any eco-
nomic situation. These presuppositions might be regarded as legitimate assumptions
for most defaults which have happened in developing countries because, judging from
1These values are the percentage decline of annual GDP from the maximum year before the nancial
crisis in 2008 to the minimum year after the crisis.
49
data on recent default episodes2, only six out of forty-one default episodes experienced
more than 5% of GDP decline and three countries recorded more than 10% decline.
Besides, as Borensztein and Panizza (2008) report, most of the default e¤ects on the
economy are short. Thus, if situations or economic characteristics are similar to these
majority prior defaults, the government would estimate the e¤ect of default relatively
well. However, these two presuppositions are not applicable to at least the Greek case.
First of all, its economic contraction was the worst among recent sovereign defaults in
the world, reducing 26.5% of GDP, and its e¤ect is still continuing ve years after the
default in 2012. It is hardly assumed that the government estimated this catastrophic
e¤ect accurately before the default and chose default by itself. Not only the govern-
ment, but also IMF, failed to estimate its e¤ect well. IMFs Independent Evaluation
O¢ ce (IEO) concluded that "The IMFs pre-crisis surveillance mostly identied the
right issues but did not foresee the magnitude of the risks that would later become
paramount".
Secondly, as Bi (2012) mentions, the endogenous default model cannot assume high
amounts of debts3. The rst reason for this is that it is necessary to assume quite drastic
and sticky TFP or endowment. The government issues bonds if a low level TFP or
endowment is realized since its purpose in issuing government bonds is to smooth inter-
temporal householdsutility. Thus, it is di¢ cult to accumulate a massive amount of
debts like many developed countries under the conventional parameter settings of TFP
or endowment unless the model assumes that the extremely low TFP or endowment
continues for a long time. The second reason is that the model has to assume the
governments reluctance to choose to default. If the government chooses default with a
2Most data is taken from 1983 to 2006 and Greece in 2012. GDP is on a purchasing-power-parity
basis. The economic contraction is measured as the GDP drop from the maximum year between
three years and one year before default to the minimum year between the time of default and three
years after the default. The three countries which have experienced more than 10% GDP decline are
Indonesia in 1998, Argentina in 2001 and Greece in 2012.
3For example, Arellano (2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2012) replicate the mean debt-to-GDP ratio
to 5.95% and 23% respectively, which is much smaller than the actual Argentinean debt-to-GDP level
of about 37%.
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small amount of debt, the average debt-to-GDP ratio will also be low even though the
model assumes the drastic and sticky TFP or endowment. Thus, the government needs
to accumulate its debts instead of selecting default, and price makers of government
bonds trust that the government will not choose default with a relatively small amount
of debts. However, this point contradicts the rst reason that the e¤ect of default
should be small and short because the government is reluctant to choose default but
the default e¤ects on the economy have to be small enough to choose default. Therefore,
it is hard to coincide with high debt-to-GDP ratio and an appropriate level of default
frequency. Of course, as I have mentioned, debt crises occur not only from high debt
amounts but for many other reasons. No one denies that high debt is one of the main
causes of crises although the criterion of high debt itself varies among countries. Hence,
we should not underestimate the problem of the endogenous default model, that it is
incapable of replication of the high debt amount.
In addition to these reasons, another problem of the endogenous default model
is that it is not useful for policy implications. The function of government is only
the issuance of bonds as I have explained, so the model excludes tax revenue and
government spending4. Therefore, I cannot address the issue to study any scal policies
in the rst place.
Finally, European countries except for Greece avoided default by all means5. These
governments implemented mixed policies to mitigate the debt crisis through austerity
and nancial management (nancial stability, smooth redemption of debt and lowering
the interest rate). For example, the Spanish government implemented an austerity plan
involving about 65 billion euro, including an increase in the value added tax (VAT)
and decrease of its transfer in 2012. Also, the ESM approved 100 billion euro of rescue
4There are several exceptions. For example, Arellano and Bai (2016) assume that a government
faces aggregate constraint and scal constraint.
5The reasons why most eurozone governments avoided defaults were not only the strong e¤ects of
default on their countrieseconomies but also the prevention of breakdown of the eurozone economic
system.
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loans, and the ECB announced that it would purchase short-term debt unlimitedly.
Therefore, considering these factors, the endogenous sovereign default model is not
regarded as an appropriate tool for the analysis of the European debt crisis. Instead I
propose a new sovereign debt crisis model which is applicable to an advanced country.
The overall framework of the model is as follows. The government issues new bonds
to households in order to nance the deciency of its budget. As the amount of
government debts increases, it increases the tax rate. However, if government debts
exceed a scal limit, the government falls into crisis. Following Bi (2012), I dene the
scal limit as the summation of discounted future primary surplus when the government
sets its tax rate on output to maximize its tax revenue. The price of government bonds
depends on the probability that the debt amount exceeds the scal limit in the next
period. In order to prevent drastic movement in prices, the government guarantees
the exogenous amount of repayment reduced by the cutback rate at the time of the
crisis. Then, it rolls over the bonds until it recovers to its normal state. Also, the
government is obligated to set the exogenous tax rate during the crisis as an austerity
measure. In addition to this, following Mendoza and Yue (2012), I assume that the
amount of imports of intermediate goods decreases due to the higher interest rate of
working capital in the crisis state.
Next, it is important to point out the distinction between domestic and foreign
government bonds. According to Gros (2013), while domestic government bond holders
put pressure on the government to serve debts, the government does not have a high
incentive to repay debt by increasing tax or reducing expenditure in the case of foreign
debt. Usually, a high risk premium would be an incentive to serve debts even in the
case of foreign debts, but monetary union loosened the discipline of scal management
in the Euro countries. In addition to this, he also points out that the higher debt
repayment burden leads to welfare loss in the case of foreign debts, while domestic debts
are internal redistributed. In the European case, more than half of total government
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bonds are held by domestic agents in Italy and Spain, but foreigners hold the majority
of Greek and Irish government bonds as Figure 3.1 shows. According to Reinhart and
Rogo¤ (2011), the proportion of total central government debt held by domestic agents
has been quite high in developed countries. Thus, I assume domestic government bonds
in this chapter and calibrate the Spanish economy. However, I also provide a model
for the foreign government bond case and analyze the Greek crisis in the next chapter.
Figure 3.1: Proportion of government bond held by domestic agents
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Source: The central bank in each country.
The results of my analysis can be summarized in three points. First, fundamental
economic conditions provide the mechanism for a debt crisis in an advanced country
from the scal limit and the issuance of government bonds. In the case of recession or
expansionary government policy, the scal limit is lower and the government needs to
issue more debt, and that leads to higher risk of debt crisis. Second, the compatibility
of the simulation of the data to sovereign debt crisis in Spain is generally sound,
matching the average debt-to-GDP ratio, the frequency of crisis and moments of main
variables. The average debt-to-GDP ratio is high enough for an advanced country, and
the high debt is compatible with the frequency of crisis. The third point is that unlike
endogenous default models, my model is exible enough to quantify many varieties
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of government policies. For instance, the 5% reduction of government consumption
reduces the average debt-to-GDP from 47% to 9% and crisis frequency from 0.75% to
0.10% but sacrices the level of GDP by 0.8% in the normal state.
Related Literature
The canonical research of the endogenous default model is studied by Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). They analyze the Argentinean default in 2001
within the framework of an RBC model. Many papers extend the framework of this
endogenous sovereign default mechanism. Mendoza and Yue (2012) introduce the pro-
duction sector and assume the nancial autarky as a punishment for a governments
decision to default. Yue (2010) studies the economic recovery by incorporating the
ex post debt renegotiation. DErasmo (2011) includes the governments reputation to
explain the high debt-to-GDP ratio. Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) introduce long-
term bonds. Gu (2015) assumes a two countriesmodel and analyzes the default e¤ect
on trades. Kushwah (2014) explores default e¤ects on nancial ows in a monetary
union. Growing number of papers incorporate the nancial sector into the endogenous
sovereign default. Sosa Padilla (2014) studies the e¤ect of sovereign default via the
nancial system. Perez (2015) quanties nancial contraction through the e¤ects of
balance sheets and liquidity. Engler and Ste¤en (2014) assume heterogeneous banks
and introduce dysfunction in the interbank market as a default punishment. Arellano
et al. (2013) provides a sovereigns partial repayment model. Salomao (2017) also
studies partial default incorporating the CDS contracts. In terms of the relation with
scal policies, Arellano and Bai (2016) analyze e¤ects of scal austerity, assuming that
the government faces both aggregate and scal constraints. Uribe (2006) and Schabert
(2010) analyze a sovereign default as a political necessity.
In terms of the scal capability, Ghosh et al. (2012) analyze the debt limit that
the government cannot roll over. Bi (2012) models a partial default when the govern-
ment debt outstanding exceeds a scal limit derived from the La¤er curve. However,
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their research includes only the risk of default and does not assume the default state
explicitly. Leeper and Walker (2011), Bi and Leeper (2012) also study the scal limit
in advanced countries from the La¤er curve. Bocola (2016) studies the pass-through
of sovereign risk incorporating nancial intermediaries, assuming the exogenous prob-
ability of sovereign default. Davig et al. (2010, 2011) also assume the scal limit from
the exogenous logistic distribution function.
Layout
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the model to analyze
the sovereign debt crisis. Section 3.3 sets functional forms and calibrates parameters.
Section 3.4 delivers the quantitative results; consisting of scal limits, decision rules
and simulations. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
The framework of the model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium of the small
open economy, consisting of four domestic agents: households, nal goods rms, inter-
mediate goods rms and a government, and one foreign agent. Households and both
types of rms are a continuum of unit measure. The government imposes taxes for
output production, pays transfers to households, consumes nal goods and issues new
bonds in order to nance the deciency in its budget. The tax rate is determined by a
rule depending on the amount of debt. The government falls into the crisis if its debts
exceed a scal limit, which is dened as the discounted summation of future maximum
primary surplus. Then, the government repays its debts to households reduced by an
exogenous cutback rate. International nancial organizations intervene to balance the
governments budget constraints in the state of crisis. In this state, the amount of im-
portation of intermediate goods declines from the amount in the normal state because
of the high interest rate for working capital. As long as the crisis state continues, the
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same amount of debts is carried over to the next period. Finally, the government has
a chance to go back to the normal state with exogenous stochastic probability after a
certain mandatary crisis duration. The rst graph of Appendix C.1 depicts the overall
picture of the economy in the normal state.
The economic state can be categorized into three situations. The rst situation is
that the government is in the normal state at the beginning of period t and does not fall
into the crisis during the period t. The second case is the government is in the normal
state at the beginning of period t and falls into the crisis during the period t. The
last state is that the crisis state continues from the previous period. For simplicity, t
denotes the state of the economy at the beginning of period t, taking n;t in the normal
state and c;t in the crisis state. Similarly, t represents whether the government falls
into the crisis or not during the period t, taking n;t and c;t as normal and crisis states
respectively. Thus, the rst economic situation can be expressed as (; ) = (n; n),
and so as (; ) = (n; c) and  = c in the second and third situations respectively.
3.2.1 Government
In the normal state, the governments expenditure consists of the reimbursement of
government bonds issued in the previous period Bt 1, government consumption Gt
and transfers to households Zt, and its revenue consists of tax revenue Tt and newly
issued government bond Bt priced by households as qt. The government issues its bonds
only for domestic households to nance the deciency in its budget. Characteristics of
government bonds are one period maturity, zero coupon and non-contingent. In the
crisis state, the government issues bonds not to balance its budget but to roll over the
bonds.
First of all, I assume that government consumption Gt is determined exogenously.
Following Gali et al (2007), government consumption measured as the deviation from
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the steady state criteria G standardized by the steady state GDP6 is
gt  (Gt  G)=GDP (3.1)
gt follows the AR(1) process as:
gt = ggt 1 + "g;t (3.2)
where "g;t  N(0; 2g). Next, following Bi (2012), the government transfer depends on
TFP as:
Zt = Z + 
z(eAt   eA) (3.3)
where Z and A are the criteria of transfer and TFP respectively and the parameter
z( 0) is the elasticity of TFP to transfer. The parameter z takes a non-positive
value because the government transfer is considered to be countercyclical toward the
business cycle as a function of social insurance for households. TFP also follows the
AR(1) process as:
At = AAt 1 + "A;t (3.4)
where "A  N(0; 2A). The government imposes tax only on nal goods Yt, so the total
tax revenue is dened as:
Tt =  tYt (3.5)
where  t is the tax rate on output.
If the government does not fall into crisis (i.e. t = n;t), following Bi (2012), the
government sets the simple tax rule in the normal state as:
 t =  + (Bt 1  B) (3.6)
6In my model, rms import intermediate goods from foreign countries, so GDP is dened as output
of nal goods minus the amount of imports.
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where  and B are criteria of the tax rate and government bonds outstanding respec-
tively and ( 0) is the elasticity parameter of government bonds to the tax rate.
The tax rate depends only on previous issuance of government bonds Bt 1, and the
government increases its tax rate as the amount of bonds increases in order to reduce
its high level of debts. Then, the government repays the full amount of debt issued in
the previous period Bt 1 to households and issues new bonds Bt. Thus, the amount of
issuance of government bonds Bt is:
qtBt = Bt 1 +Gt + Zt   Tt (3.7)
However, if the government falls into the crisis (i.e. t = c;t), it repays the amount
of remitted bonds (1   )Bt 17 where  is the exogenous cutback rate, and issues the
same amount of bonds.
B = (1  )Bt 1 (3.8)
I assume the price of government bonds is unity in the state of crisis8, so government
bonds do not a¤ect the budget constraint. Thus, the budget constraint in the case
of (t; t) = (n;t; c;t) is Tt + 
IO
t = Gt + Zt where 
IO
t is the international nancial
organizationsintervention to satisfy the budget constraint. I assume that government
consumption Gt and transfers Zt in the crisis state also follow the same process as
in the normal state. However, the organizations obligate the government to set an
exogenous xed tax rate  d as an austerity policy. Thus, the tax rate in the crisis state
is
 t = 
d (3.9)
7There is a possibility that the government cannot prepare for this amount of repayment in the
crisis, so I assume international nancial organizations guarantee the exogenous amount of repayment
at the time of crisis.
8The economic background of this assumption is that nancial international organizations provide
perfect warrant of the repayment of debts, so the price of government bonds is indi¤erent to the
domestic currency.
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The governments revenue Tt and expenditure Gt+Zt are determined independently
in the crisis state and the government cannot issue its bonds to satisfy the budget con-
straint, so the international nancial organizations need to satisfy the budget constraint
by providing the bailout IOt
9. As long as the crisis state continues, government bonds
are rolled over to the next period.
When the government regains the normal state from the crisis at the end of period
t   1, the debt amount that the government has to repay is set to the exogenously
given amount Br. Normally, Br should be equal to the rolling-over value, but if the
cutback rate is low, the government starts from a high debt amount when it regains the
non-default state. Thus, I set a di¤erent debt value when the government regains the
non-default state. I assume the international nancial organizations pay the di¤erence
between the rolling-over value and Br10.
3.2.2 Households
Households are innitely lived and derive utility from consumption Ct and disutility
from labor measured by hours worked Lt. They provide labor force to both nal
and intermediate goods rms, and receive wages wtLt and prots t from them. The
government transfers nal goods Zt and transacts its bonds with households. Finally,
they consume nal goods.
The householdsutility maximization problem is
max
Ct;Lt;BHt
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu(Ct; Lt)
#
(3.10)
In the case (t; t) = (n;t; n;t),
s:t: Ct + qtB
H
t (n;t; n;t)  wtLt +Bt 1 +t + Zt (3.11)
9The bailout can be negative if the governments revenue is higher than expenditure.
10I examine the case that Br is equal to the rolling-over value in the alternative scenario section.
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In the case (t; t) = (n;t; c;t),
s:t: Ct +B
H
t (n;t; c;t)  wtLt + (1  )Bt 1 +t + Zt (3.12)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor of household, BHt is the householdsdemand
for government bonds and wt is the wage rate. The utility function u : R2+ ! R
is continuous, twice di¤erential and satises @u
@C
> 0; @
2u
@C2
< 0; @u
@L
< 0, @
2u
@L2
< 0 and
@2u
@c2
@2u
@L2
   @u
@c
@u
@L
2
> 0.
The rst-order conditions of the householdsoptimization problem are
wt =
uL(Ct; Lt)
uC(Ct; Lt)
(3.13)
qt = Et
uC(Ct+1; Lt+1)
uC(Ct; Lt)
f(1  Pc;t+1) + Pc;t+1(1  )g (3.14)
where Et[Pc;t+1] is the probability that the government falls into the crisis in the next
period. These two equations hold in the case of (t; t) = (n;t; n;t), but the only rst
equation holds in the case of (t; t) = (n;t; c;t) because the government falls into the
crisis and the price of government bonds is exogenously determined as unity.
When the government is in the default state at the beginning of period t (i.e.
t = c;t), the constraint is
Ct  wtLt +t + Zt (3.15)
Because the newly issued and repaid government bonds are of equal value, these bonds
do not a¤ect the householdsconstraint. Thus, the equation (3.13) is also the only
rst-order condition of the householdsoptimization problem in this state.
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3.2.3 Final Goods Firms
Final goods rms purchase intermediate goods Mt from both domestic intermediate
goods rms and foreign agents and acquire labor force Lft from households. They
borrow working capital t from foreign agents for the importation of a certain fraction of
intermediate goods. Then, nal goods rms produce nal goods from the intermediate
goods and labor force and sell them to households and the government.
The technology of production follows the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = e
AtMMt (L
f
t )
L (3.16)
whereMMt is intermediate inputs which are composed of domestic intermediate inputs
mdt and imported intermediate inputs m

t , and parameters 0 < M ; L < 1 are the
shares of intermediate goods and labor inputs respectively, satisfying M + L < 1. I
abstract capital input for simplicity11.
The technology of the combination of domestic intermediate goods and imported
intermediate goods follows the CES aggregator:
Mt =


 
mdt
  1
 + (1  ) (mt )
  1
 
  
  1
(3.17)
where  2 [0; 1] is the share of domestic intermediate goods in total intermediate
goods composition and  (> 0) is the elasticity of substitution across domestic and
imported intermediate goods. These intermediate goods are dened as the summation
of the continuum of di¤erentiated domestic and imported intermediate goods mdj;t;m

j:t
11Refer to the previous chapter for the justication of abstraction of the capital input. I introduce
capital in the next chapter.
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respectively by using the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
mdt 
Z 1
0
 
mdj;t
  1
 dj
 
 1
and mt 
Z 1

 
mj;t
  1
 dj +
Z 
0
 
mj;t
  1
 dj
 
 1
(3.18)
where (> 1) is the substitution elasticity between di¤erentiated domestic and im-
ported intermediate goods, setting the same value on this substitution elasticity of
these two intermediate goods. Final goods rms have to borrow working capital with
its interest rate rt in advance in order to import a certain fraction  2 [0; 1] of in-
termediate goods from foreign agents. Thus, the working capital constraint for these
imported intermediate goods is
t
1 + rt

Z 
0
pj;tm

j;tdj (3.19)
where pj;t is the price of imported intermediate input m

j;t. The rms do not borrow
working capital exceeding the minimum requirement, so the constraint is held with
equality.
I adopt the two-stage budgeting method to solve the optimization problem of nal
goods producers: the prot maximization problem in the rst stage and the cost min-
imization problem of imported intermediate goods in the next stage. First of all, the
rms maximize the following problem in the rst stage:
max
mt ;mdt ;L
f
t
ft = Yt(1   t)  ptmt   pmt mdt   wtLft (3.20)
subject to the production function (3.16) and the combining technology of domestic
and imported intermediate goods (3.17). The choice variables are inputs of production
mt ;m
d
t and L
f
t . The government imposes tax on outputs with the rate  t, so after
tax sales of nal output are Yt(1   t). The rst-order conditions with respect to each
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control variable are
eAtMM
M   1 
t (1  )(mt )
 1
 

Lft
L
(1   t) = pt (3.21)
eAtMM
M   1 
t 
 
mdt
 1
 

Lft
L
(1   t) = pmt (3.22)
eAtLM
M
t

Lft
L 1
(1   t) = wt (3.23)
The next stage is the cost minimization problem with respect to imported inter-
mediate goods. By substituting the working capital constraint (3.19) into the cost
function, the problem is as follows:
min
mjt
Z 1

pj;tm

jtdj + (1 + r

t )
Z 
0
pj;tm

jtdj (3.24)
subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of imported intermediate goods (3.18). The
solution to the problem is derived as:
mj;t=

pj;t
pt
 v
mt ; for j 2 [; 1] (3.25)
mj;t=

(1 + rt )p

j;t
pt
 v
mt ; for j 2 [0; ] (3.26)
pt =
Z 1

 
pj;t
1 v
dj +
Z 
0
 
(1 + r)pj;t
1 v
dj
 1
1 v
(3.27)
where pt is the shadow price of combining imported intermediate goods with the min-
imum cost, which can be interpreted as the aggregate price of imported intermediate
goods. Following Mendoza and Yue (2012), imported intermediate goods are traded in
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the world market at the price of numeraire. Thus, their price is simplied as:
pt = [(1  ) + (1 + rt )1  ]
1
1  (3.28)
In the normal state, the interest rate on working capital rt is same as the world risk-
free interest rate rf because nal goods rms borrow it through the world market and
I abstract the possibility of rmsdefault. However, interest rates for working capital
will surge in the crisis because of the increase in the countrys specic risk premium.
The interest rate in the crisis state is assumed to be the return on government bonds
with the same marginal utility with respect to current and next period consumption
under the condition of denite occurrence of crisis12. Therefore, the interest rate on
working capital is
rt =
8>><>>:
rf if (; ) = (n; n)
1=(  (1  ))  1 otherwise
(3.29)
Finally, GDP can be dened as outputs minus the amount of imports as:
GDPt = Yt   ptmt (3.30)
3.2.4 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods rms produce intermediate goods from labor Lmt and sell them to
nal goods rms. The technology of intermediate goods is
mdt = A
I (Lmt )
 (3.31)
12Mendoza and Yue (2012) assume that rms in the default state cannot import intermediate goods
which are required as working capital for j 2 [0; ] because the interest rate on working capital is
innite due to exclusion from world credit markets. Unlike in their model, I do not assume the
government debt crisis involves full default, so it is legitimate not to assume nancial autarky of the
economy during the crisis state.
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where AI is an invariant TFP coe¢ cient and  2 [0; 1] is the share of labor inputs for
intermediate goods production. Then, the prot maximization problem of intermediate
goods rms is
max
Lmt
mt = p
m
t A
I (Lmt )
   wtLmt (3.32)
Then, the rst-order condition with respect to Lmt is
wt = p
m
t A
I (Lmt )
 1 (3.33)
3.2.5 Crisis Scheme
In this section, I restrict the government state to the normal state n;t at the beginning
of period t because the transition in economic state only matters in crisis scheme. The
state vector is summarized as Snt 2 fAt; gt; Bt 1; n;tg.
If the expected issuance of government bond B(Snt ) is lower than or equal to the
scal limit Bmax(At; gt), which I will dene in the section 3.2.7, the government stays
in the normal state during the period t. However, if the newly issued government bond
is higher than the scal limit, the government falls into the crisis state. Thus, the
transition of government state (Snt ; B
max
t ) can be dened as:
(Snt ; B
max
t ) =
8>><>>:
n;t if B(S
n
t )  Bmax(At; gt)
c;t otherwise
(3.34)
Next, in order to obtain the price of government bonds (equation (3.14)), it is
necessary to derive the probability of crisis in the next period. First of all, I dene the
crisis set in order to acquire the probability of crisis. The crisis set  (n;t; Bt 1; B
max
t ) is
for the set of TFP and government consumption such that the newly issued government
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bond is larger than the scal limit.
 (n;t; Bt 1; B
max
t ) = fAt 2 A, gt 2 G : B(& t; Bt 1) > Bmax(At; gt)g (3.35)
The probability of crisis in the next period Et[Pc(Snt+1; Bmaxt+1 jSnt ; n;t)] is dened from
the transition of TFP fA(At+1; At) and government consumption f g(gt+1; gt) from time
t to t+1 and the default set  (n+1; B
max
t+1 ). The probability of crisis in the next period
can be expressed by the current variables (At; gt; Bt; n;t; n;t)
13 and exogenous variable
Bmaxt+1 as P
e
c (At; gt; Bt; n;t; n;t; B
max
t+1 ). Then, the probability of crisis in the next period
is
P ec (At; gt; Bt; n;t; n;t; B
max
t+1 ) = Et[Pc(Snt+1; Bmaxt+1 jSnt ; n;t)] (3.36)
=
Z Z
 (n+1;Bt;B
max
t+1 )
fA(At+1; At)f
g(gt+1; gt)dAt+1dgt+1
3.2.6 Equilibrium
The new state vector is summarized as St 2 fAt; gt; Bt 1; tg. At and gt are the transi-
tions of TFP and government consumption measured by the deviation from the steady
state criteria divided by steady state GDP respectively. These two state variables fol-
low the AR(1) process dened in equations (3.1) and (3.4). Bt 1 is the government
bond carried over from the previous period, and t is the government state at the
beginning of period t.
Denition
A competitive equilibrium is dened as policy functions for private agents fC(S),L(S),
BH(S),m(S),md(S),Lf (S),Lm(S)g, prices fw(S),pm(S)g, the government plan of new
issuance of government bonds B(A; g;B 1; n; n), the law of motion of transition
13The government can fall into another crisis immediately after regaining the normal state from the
crisis state, but the government bond is priced only in the case of (t; t) = (n;t; n;t).
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of the economic state (Sn; Bmax) and the price of government bond fq(A; g;B; n;
n; B
max 0)g such that:
(1) For (; ) = (n; n):
Given the price of government bond, the government plan of new issuance of
government bonds satises equation (3.7).
(2) Householdspolicies satises condition (3.13) in any government state and
for (; ) = (n; n): given the crisis set and the probability of crisis, their
policies satises the equation (3.14) and the market clearing condition of
government bonds.
(3) Both nal and intermediate goods rms solve their prot maximization problems
respectively.
(4) The market for domestic intermediate good clears.
(5) The market for labor clears:
L(S) = Lf (S) + Lm(S) (3.37)
(6) The market for nal goods clears as
for (; ) = (n; n):
Y   pm = C +G (3.38)
for (; ) = (n; c) and  = c:
Y   T   pm = C   Z (3.39)
(7) For t = n;t:
The law of motion of transition of the economic state satises the equation
(3.34).
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Explanation
In terms of condition (6), because the international nancial organizations cover
the scal surplus or decits by the amount of IOt in the crisis state, the aggregate
constraint is Yt   ptmt + IOt = Ct + Gt. By substituting the government budget
equation Tt+IOt = Gt+Zt, the aggregate resource constraint is derived as in equation
(3.39).
3.2.7 Fiscal Limit
I dene the scal limit Bmax as the maximum amount of debt that the government is
able to serve. Instead of the tax rule dened in equation (3.6), the government sets its
tax rate on output to maximize tax revenue. The government can increase tax revenue
by increasing the rate when the tax rate is low enough, but the revenue will decline
if the tax rate exceeds a threshold of the maximum rate because the rate of revenue
loss from output decline is larger than the rate of revenue increase by raising the tax
rate. The revenue maximization problem depends on At and gt, so the governments
tax maximization problem is dened as:
max
 t
Tmaxt (At; gt) =  tYt(At; gt) (3.40)
subject to (3.13),(3.16),(3.17),(3.21)-(3.23),(3.28),(3.31),(3.33),(3.37),(3.38), where Tmax
is the maximum tax revenue. As a matter of course, the government does not need to
satisfy its budget constraint (3.7) and the government state is restricted to the normal
state.
Government consumption and government transfers depend on At and gt respec-
tively, so the maximum primary surplus at time t is
Tmaxt (At; gt) Gt(gt)  Zt(At) (3.41)
68
Then, the scal limit is dened as the summation of discounted maximum future
primary surplus14:
Bmax(At; gt) = E0
1X
t=0
t
umaxC (Ct; Lt)
umaxC (C0; L0)
(Tmax(At; gt) Gt(gt)  Zt(At)) (3.42)
where umaxC denotes the marginal utility of consumption under the condition of the tax
rate set to maximize the governments tax revenue. If the amount of debt exceeds this
scal limit, the government is unable to repay its debts no matter how it changes the
tax rate.
3.2.8 Timing
The overview of time ow around time t is depicted in the second graph in Appendix
C.1. I divide timelines into normal and crisis states.
<The Timeline of the Normal State>
At the beginning of period t, the government has debts Bt 1 (if it regains the
normal state from the crisis state, the amount of debt Bt 1 is equivalent to Br). First,
TFP and government consumption are revealed, and the scal limit Bmax is obtained.
Then, the government estimates the maturity-based government bond issuance Bt, and
if this value is lower than the scal limit, the government stays in the normal state.
Otherwise, the economy falls into the crisis state. Afterwards, rms produce their
goods, markets determine prices, and all agents complete their transactions including
the governments repayment of its previous debt Bt 1 and issuance of new bonds qtBt.
Then, households consume. Time t ends here and goes to next time t + 1. If the
maturity-based government bond Bt is higher than the scal limit, the timeline goes
to the crisis state.
14For simplicity, the primary surplus is derived in order to obtain the scal limit. If the model
adopts the scal surplus instead, which includes transactions of government bonds, the scal limit is
di¤erent from that in the primary surplus case.
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<The Timeline of the Crisis State>
There are two initial points in the timeline of the crisis state. If the government is in
the crisis state at the beginning of period t, it has debts Bdt 1. Then, the TFP and the
amount of government consumption are revealed. If the government falls into the crisis
from the normal state, the timeline shifts to the crisis state with the debt obligation
(1  )Bt 1. Then, rms produce their goods, markets determine prices, and all agents
complete their transactions including the governments repayment of the previous debt
Bct 1 in the case of t = c;t and (1   )Bt 1 in the case of (t; t) = (n;t; c;t), and
issuance of new bonds Bct . Then, households consume. Finally, nature decides to regain
the normal state with exogenous probability # after a certain mandatory crisis period
that the government must be in the crisis state. If nature does not choose the normal
state or the mandatory duration of the crisis state has not nished yet, the crisis state
continues to the period t+ 1 with debt Bct .
3.3 Functional Form and Calibration
The model is calibrated to the Spanish data from 1995 to 2014. The reason why I adopt
the Spanish economy is that Spain is one of the European countries which fell into a
debt crisis around 2012, and the majority of government bonds are held domestically.
First of all, the discount factor  has to be relatively small. Otherwise, the govern-
ment can take into account far future scal surpluses and the scal limit will be too
high. I set the baseline value of the discount factor to 0.91, which is lower than the
standard RBC model15, in order to target the probability of crisis at about 50% under
110% of debt-to-GDP ratio in the case of low TFP (-5% from the steady state) and
high government consumption (+5% from the steady state) from the Spanish average
15A low discount factor value is often taken in the literature of sovereign default. For example, the
value is 0.8 in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) , 0.88 in Mendoza and Yue (2012), 0.9 in Perez (2015),
0.95 in Bi (2012) and 0.953 in Arellano (2008).
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debt-to-GDP ratio after the crisis. Next, I specify the householdsutility function as:
u(ct; Lt) = logCt   ! L
1+
t
1 + 
(3.43)
where  > 0. Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), I set the inverse Frisch elasticity
of labor supply  to 0:276. The parameter of relative utility weight of hours worked !
is set to 2.23 by targeting one-third of the working time in a day. Using the HP lter,
the persistence and standard deviation of government consumption shock are 0:74 and
0:0175 respectively, and those of TFP shock are 0:82 and 0:0337 respectively16.
I set the intermediate input share in nal goods production M to 0:515 to match the
total intermediate consumption over gross output in the early 2000s17 from the OECDs
STAN Input-Output data. I set the labor input share in nal goods production L
to 0:339 because the proportion of labor share is assumed to be 70% of summation of
labor and capital inputs in most literature. I set the substitution elasticity between
domestic and foreign intermediate goods  to 0:4 in order to target about 10% decline in
imported intermediate goods by crisis from the actual Spanish data. Following Feenstra
et al. (2014), I set the Dixit-Stiglitz curvature parameter  to 3. The Armington weight
of domestic inputs  is set to 0:81 from the share of domestic intermediate goods to
GDP in the OECDs STAN Input-Output data. I set the upper bound of imported
inputs with working capital  and the invariant TFP coe¢ cient for intermediate goods
production AI to 0.7 and 0.31 from Mendoza and Yue (2012). The world risk-free
interest rate rf is set to 0.01, which is the standard value of the RBC model. The
labor share in the production of intermediate goods  is also set to 0.7.
I set the criteria of government consumption G, transfer Z, government debt B
and tax rate  to 0.0187, 0.0147, 0.066 and 0.307 respectively so as to match the
ratios of the steady state level of GDP to government consumption 0:190, government
16I adopt TFP as GDP per person employed.
17This data does not specify the exact period.
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Table 3.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Target/Source
: Discount factor of households 0.91 Fiscal Limit
: Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
!: Relative utility weight of hours worked 2.23 1/3 working time
g: Persistence of govt consumption shock 0.74 OECD
g: Standard deviation of govt consumption shock 0.0175 OECD
A: Persistence of TFP shock 0.82 OECD
A: Standard deviation of TFP shock 0.0337 OECD
M : Intermediate input share in nal goods production 0.515 OECD
L: Labor input share in nal goods production 0.339 Labor Share (70%)
 : Substitution elasticity across intermediate goods 0.4 10% decline by crisis
: Substitution elasticity within intermediate goods 3 Feenstra et al. (2014)
: Armington weight of domestic inputs 0.81 OECD
: Imported goods with working capital 0.7 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
AI : Invariant TFP coe¢ cient for int. goods production 0.31 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
rf : World risk-free interest rate 0.01 Standard Value
: Labor input share in int. goods production 0.7 Standard Value
G: Government consumption criterion 0.0187 OECD (G=GDP = 0:190)
Z: Government transfer criterion 0.0147 OECD (Z=GDP = 0:149)
B: Government debt criterion 0.066 OECD (B=GDP = 0:67)
 : Tax rate criterion 0.307 OECD (Rn=GDP = 0:379)
 d: Tax rate criterion in the crisis state 0.321 OECD (Rd=GDPd = 0:40)
: Elasticity of tax 0.37 Bi (2012)
z: Elasticity of transfers to productivity 0 data
: Cutback rate 0.10 Householdsnancial assets
transfers 0:149, government debt 0:67 and tax revenue 0:37918. I obtained the data
on government transfers, government debt and tax revenue from OECD data between
1995 and 2014, but government consumption consists of many components, so I set the
above value in order to obtain a balanced budget at 45% of debt-to-GDP ratio. In this
situation, tax revenue is equal to government expenditure including government bond
repayments under the condition that the price of government bonds is equivalent to the
discount factor  in the steady state. I set the exogenous tax rate in the crisis state to
0:321 from 40% of the tax revenue to GDP so as to be about 5% higher than the normal
18The tax is not imposed on GDP but on outputs, so I subtract the amount of imported intermediate
goods following equation (3.30).
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state. Following Bi (2012), I set the elasticity of the tax rate  to 0.37. In terms of the
elasticity of transfers to productivity z, transfers over GDP had been constant and
were not elastic to TFP variation before the global nancial crisis in 2008, so I set this
rate to 0. Finally, government bonds are the only asset for households in my model, so
I set the proportion of government bondscutback rate  by targeting the householdss
asset data. According to the OECDs data, the average households nancial assets
per capita discounted by ination from 2010 to 2012 was about 10% lower than the
maximum value before the nancial crisis, so I set  to 0.1 as the baseline. However, I
also examine other values in the alternative scenario section.
3.4 Quantitative Results
The quantitative results consist of three layers: the scal limit, decision rules and
simulations. In the section of the scal limit, I report the La¤er curve and GDP
mapped by the tax rate, and scal surplus movement at rst. Then, the scal limit is
derived from the summation of discounted maximum future scal surplus as dened
in equation (3.42). After that, I show the criterion of probability of crisis depending
on the state variables. Next, I show the decision rules of new issuance of government
bonds, probability of crisis and price of government bonds and also the decision rules
of the main endogenous variables. Finally, I report simulation results both in the long-
run and around the crisis period, and also results of alternative scenarios in order to
examine the e¤ects of di¤erent government policies.
3.4.1 Fiscal Limit
The above two graphs in Figure 3.2 show the La¤er curve under di¤erent values of
state variables, At and gt. The left graph is the La¤er curves in three di¤erent states
of At xing gt at the steady state, and the right graph is the curves in three di¤erent
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Figure 3.2: La¤er Curve and GDP
(a) La¤er Curve with g at steady state (b) La¤er Curve with A at steady state
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(c) GDP with g at steady state (d) GDP with A at steady state
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Note 1: "High" and "low" represents 5% higher and lower than the steady state respectively.
Note 2: The level of GDP is the value under the steady state regardless of di¤erent values of state variables.
states of gt xing At at the steady state. If both variables are at the steady state, the
tax revenue over GDP will be maximized to be 47.0% at 53.6% of the tax rate. Also,
the maximum tax revenues over GDP are 49.8% and 44.4% by setting the tax rate to
53.9% and 53.6% in the high and low TFP cases respectively. Similarly, the maximum
tax revenues are 49.0% and 45.2% over GDP when the tax rates are 54.8% and 52.7%
in the high and low government consumption cases respectively. The tax revenue in
the high government consumption case will be higher than the baseline because the
amount of outputs will be higher. Corresponding to the La¤er curves, the two graphs
below in Figure 3.2 show the values of GDP mapping from the tax rate. The pace of
GDP decline is accelerating as the tax rate increases. For example, the decline in GDP
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from changing the tax rate from 70% to 80% is about 47% larger than that from 20%
to 30% under the steady state of gt and At.
Figure 3.3: Fiscal Surplus
(a) with g at steady state (b) with A at steady state
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Next, given the La¤er curve, I consider the scal surplus to obtain the scal limit.
I simulated 2000 times for 200 periods, depending on the initial states of At and gt. A
detailed explanation of the computational algorithm is in Appendix C.2. Figures 3.3
shows the transition of scal surplus under the tax rate to maximize the tax revenue
in three di¤erent initial states of At and gt, xing another variable at the steady state.
The scal surplus under the steady states of At and gt is about 13.1% over steady state
GDP. The left graph reports that the scal surplus in the high At case is about 2.8%
points higher than the steady state and that in low At is about 2.6% points lower than
the steady state in the rst period. However, as time passes, At is converging to the
steady state and so is the scal surplus. The right graph shows the di¤erent levels of
gt under a steady state of At. In the case of low and high gt, the scal surplus is 2.9%
higher and 3.0% lower than the steady state case in the initial period respectively, and
it also converges to the steady state level as time goes on.
Figure 3.4 describes the average of total trials of scal limits, which is dened as
the summation of discounted scal surplus derived from Figure 3.3. This gure shows
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Figure 3.4: Fiscal Limit
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Note: The scal limit is the average of total trials.
the combination of debt-to-GDP ratio and At under three di¤erent levels of gt, and
the government falls into the crisis when the amount of debt exceeds these colored
areas. For example, if gt is the middle level in the initial period, the scal limit is
about 133% of GDP under the middle At level. As the value of At changes, the scal
limit shifts in direct proportion to TFP, taking 146% and 119% over GDP in the case
of 5% points higher and lower than the neutral case respectively. Also, the scal limit
changes -11.6% and +12.1% from the middle level of gt by changing its value to high
and low respectively.
Figure 3.5: Crisis Probability (Fiscal Limit)
(a) with g at steady state (b) with A at steady state
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Next, Figure 3.5 is the probability of crisis under three di¤erent values of At and
gt. While Figure 3.4 is the average of all trials, Figure 3.5 is the cumulative density
functions of the scal limit depending on the stochastic transitions of At and gt. If
both At and gt are at the steady state (the black curve), the probability of crisis is less
than 1% in 114% debt-to-GDP level and jumps up, reaching 50% and 99% in 134%
and 149% of debt-to-GDP ratio respectively. If At is low and gt is in steady state, the
probabilities of crisis in 1%, 50% and 99% are 104%, 119% and 134% of debt-to-GDP
ratio respectively. Similarly, if At is high, the probabilities of crisis in 1%, 50% and
99% are 126%, 146% and 164% debt-to-GDP ratio respectively. The case of di¤erent
gt reports similar results to At in the right graph.
3.4.2 Decision Rules
In this section, I explain the relation between the newly issued government bonds
Bt, the probability of crisis Et[Pc;t+1] and the price of government bonds qt. Figure
3.6 maps the debt-to-GDP ratio to these three variables, xing TFP and government
consumption at the steady state19.
Graph (a) is the decision rule of newly issued government bonds under the condition
that the government does not fall into crisis (i.e. the maturity base of current issuance
of government bonds Bt is smaller than the scal limit Bmax). Both horizontal and
vertical axes are standardized by steady state GDP. The red and pink curves represent
the maturity base (Bt) and discount by its price (qtBt) respectively, and the black
dotted line is the 45 degree line. If the red curve is above the line, the government
has to repay a larger amount of debt in the next period than the current period, and
if the pink curve is in the same condition, the government needs to acquire more than
the amount of repayments. The decision rules of government bonds show that the
maturity and discount base curves are slightly higher and lower than the 45 degree line
19Di¤erent TFP and government consumption cases are in Appendix C.3.
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Figure 3.6: Bond Related Variables
(a) Government Bond (b) Probability of Crisis
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Note: Debt-to-GDP ratios in the horizontal axis represent the amount of repayment of government bond
Bt 1, except for the red curve of maturity base debt Bt.
respectively under the condition of below about 100% of debt-to-GDP ratio. However,
as the debt amount increases, exceeding 100% of debt-to-GDP ratio, the government
has to repay a larger amount of debt in the next period than the current period due to
the decrease in the price of government bonds. For instance, while the reimbursement
of debt in the next period (Bt) is 105% if the previous debt-to-GDP ratio is 100%, the
amounts of debt are 129% and 152% in the cases of previous debt at 120% and 140%
respectively.
The middle graph (b) shows the probability of crisis. The brown curve marked
by diamond shapes and the red curve are mapped from the previous debt (Bt 1) and
the maturity-based debt (Bt) respectively. The solid black and dotted green and light
blue curves show the probability of crisis based on the scal limit under the steady
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state, low and high levels of TFP respectively, which are obtained from Figure 3.5. As
I have explained in section 2.7, the criterion of debt amount whether the government
falls into crisis or not depends on maturity-based government bonds. The graph shows
that as the previous debt increases, the maturity-based debt is larger following the
decision rules of government bonds. Then, the probability of crisis is derived as the
cumulative probability that maturity-based debt exceeds the scal limit. For example,
the probability of crisis is 50% when the maturity-based debt is about 132% of debt-
to-GDP ratio, which corresponds to 124% of previous debt.
The bottom graph (c) depicts the price of government bonds following the house-
holdsbond pricing equation (3.14). If the debt-to-GDP ratio is in the safe zone (less
than about 100% of debt-to-GDP ratio), the bond price is relatively constant at about
0.91, which is the value of the discount factor. Then, the price of government bonds
declines when the debt-to-GDP ratio is in the risky zone (between about 100% and
150% of debt-to-GDP ratio) due to the increased probability of crisis. The price keeps
decreasing even after the risky zone because the marginal utility of consumption in the
current period increases by the increase in tax rate, but is constant in the next period
because of the xed tax rate in the crisis state.
Therefore, all three graphs in Figure 3.6 are related to each other. The high amount
of debt induces the increase of the probability of crisis, the high crisis probability
decreases the price of government bonds, and the low government price leads to high
debt amount.
Next, Figure 3.7 describes the decision rules of the main endogenous variables: tax
rate, imported intermediate goods, output, tax revenue, GDP, consumption, domestic
intermediate goods, wages and hours worked. These graphs report the cases of steady
state, low TFP and high government consumption in both crisis and normal states.
Obviously, the debt amount is irrelevant to any variables in the case of crisis, so the
values are parallel to the horizontal axis. Also, government consumption in the crisis
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Figure 3.7: Decision Rules of Main Variables
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state does not a¤ect these variables because of the intervention of international nancial
organizations.
First of all, the tax rate in the normal state is the function of only the debt amount
regardless of other state variables, so its rate increases linearly as debts rise. Second,
the crisis e¤ects on imported intermediate goods are relatively large. When the debt-
to-GDP ratio is 100%, imported goods in the crisis state are 7% lower than the normal
state under the steady state of At and gt. This di¤erence between crisis and normal
states is one of the main channels of economic contraction due to the crisis. Output
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is also a decreasing function in the amount of debt because the government increases
its tax rate as the amount of debt increases as graph (a) shows. Next, tax revenue
in the normal state is increasing as debt-to-GDP increases but the pace of increase is
sluggish due to lower output levels. The tax revenue exceeds the crisis case when the
debt amount is higher than about 110% of debt-to-GDP ratio. GDP and consumption
show similar movement to output. Householdsconsumption in the high government
consumption case is lower than the steady state level because of the crowding out e¤ect.
Besides, the decline in consumption in the crisis state is larger than in the GDP case
because the aggregate resource constraint is di¤erent from the normal state and the
tax revenue negatively a¤ects consumption. Next, domestic intermediate goods and
wages are decreasing in the debt-to-GDP ratio and TFP, but the proportion of decline
of domestic intermediate goods is limited in the low TFP case. Wages decline under
high government consumption due to lower levels of household consumption. Finally,
hours worked increase in the case of low levels of TFP and the crisis state. According
to equation (3.13), wages are determined by the marginal utility in hours worked over
consumption, and the latter e¤ect is larger than the former e¤ects under low TFP. In
addition to this, low productivity increases cost per unit of production, so more labor
is necessary to maintain the given amount of output20. Hours worked increase under
the crisis state because the prices of imported and domestic intermediate goods decline
more than wages decrease, so nal goods rms sustain production by increasing labor
inputs and that leads to an increase in hours worked in the crisis state.
3.4.3 Simulation results
I generate stochastic TFP processes 2000 times for 500 periods and trace the movement
of variables. The government starts from the non-default state, and the initial values
of TFP and government bonds outstanding are neutral and 30% of debt-to-GDP ratio
20This result is consistent with other canonical papers such as Gali (1999) and Smets and Wouters
(2007).
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respectively, but I discard the rst 100 periods in order to eliminate the e¤ect of these
initial conditions.
In terms of the crisis duration, other literature using endogenous sovereign default
models assumes that the government has a chance to regain the normal state soon
after the crisis. Otherwise, it will be an intricate model due to the assumption of a
mandatory crisis period that a government has to stay in the crisis, and the government
would not choose default in the rst place under this assumption. Besides, it might
be an appropriate assumption for developing countries that the government can soon
recover its normal state, as Borenstein and Panizza (2009) report, the default duration
is usually short. However, the European debt crisis, at least, was di¤erent from those in
developing countries because governmentsscal and economic situations had stagnated
for many years after the debt problems occurred. Thus, in order to make the model
more exible and suitable to the actual economy, I set the duration of the mandatory
crisis state to eight quarters from the time the Greek government defaulted in March
2012 until it returned to the bond market in April 2014. I refer to the Greek bond
market because, as De Grauwe and Ji (2013) point out, negative self-fullling market
sentiments signicantly a¤ected the surge of spreads in eurozone countries. I also report
the zero mandatory crisis period as endogenous default models assume. After the
mandatory crisis period, the government can regain the normal state with exogenous
probability. Dias and Richmond (2007) report that the average duration of exclusion
from international capital markets by default is 5.7 years, so I set the probability to
regain the normal state at 0.044. If the government regains the normal state, it can
start from the half of the steady state GDP level as the benchmark. However, I examine
di¤erent values in the section on alternative scenarios.
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Table 3.2: Simulation Results
Data Simulation
Average Debt-to-GDP 67.6% 47.0%
Default/Crisis Frequency 0.60% 0.75%
Average Bond Spread 0.71% 5.78%
The correlation with GDP
-Output 99.9% 92.4%
-Consumption 98.6% 74.9%
-Imported Intermediate Goods 83.8% 72.1%
-Domestic Intermediate Goods 98.8% 61.6%
-Hours Worked -77.4% 12.8%
-Tax Rate -12.2% -17.0%
-Tax Revenue 98.1% 70.9%
Note 1: The Spanish government has experienced default 13 times since 1476. Source: Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008).
Note 2: Bond spread in data is 10-year government bond premium toward the yields of German bonds, while that
in simulation represents the annual rate of reciprocal of government bond price minus that of bond price
without the possibility of crisis.
Baseline Results
Table 3.2 reports the average debt-to-GDP ratio, frequency of default or crisis, average
bond spread and the correlations of GDP with main variables in both data of the actual
Spanish economy and the simulation results under the baseline parameter settings.
These values are taken from 1995 to 2014 including the crisis period, except for the
bond spread which is taken from 1995 to 2007.
First of all, although the average debt-to-GDP ratio in data (67.6%) is relatively
higher than the simulation (47.0%), the model replicates a high enough value to rep-
resent advanced economies, unlike the endogenous default models. The reason for the
simulations lower debt than the data is that once the probability of crisis takes a
large enough value and high government consumption or low TFP continue for several
quarters, the government bond is on a divergent path as its decision rule (Figure 3.6
(a)) shows, and the government falls into crisis within a relatively short period. Next,
the default or debt crisis frequencies in the data (0.60% per quarter) and simulation
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(0.75% per quarter) show similar values. In the endogenous default model, the de-
fault frequency is trade-o¤ with debt-to-GDP ratio because a high amount of debt
indicates a governments reluctance to choose default. For example, Arellano (2008)
obtains about 6% of debt-to-GDP ratio in order to target 3% of default frequency,
but Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) report about 23% debt-to-GDP ratio and 0.02% of
default frequency using a similar model. However, my model is compatible with the
high debt-to-GDP ratio and high enough crisis frequency. The average bond spread
of baseline simulation is higher than that of the data. In terms of data, government
bonds in Euro countries had been treated as the same or almost the same as the most
secure bonds in the region (i.e. German bonds) before the debt crisis, so the bonds
risk premium had been almost zero for a long time21. In terms of the simulation, the
risk premium on an annual basis takes a high value in the risky debt region because
the price of government bonds takes a low value due to the 10% of cutback rate.
The correlations between GDP and other main variables22 are in the second half
of the Table 3.2. The relations between GDP and output, consumption and imported
and domestic intermediate goods are high in both the data and the simulation. There
is no quarterly or annual data on imported intermediate goods, so I adopt the amount
of total imports as an alternative variable. Hours worked shows a negative correlation
with GDP in the data because of the downward trend though time, and the correlation
with GDP in the simulation is low because hours worked is procyclical with debt and
government consumption but countercyclical with TFP and economic state of crisis.
The tax rate is in weak negative relation with GDP in both data and simulation.
Finally, in terms of tax revenue, while the tax revenue in the data is highly related to
GDP, the simulation result reports a weaker relation than the data because the high
tax rate pushes down GDP. I report gures for these variables in order to grasp the
21This low interest rate was the prime reason for the housing bubble in Spain.
22There is no annual or quarterly data for imported and domestic intermediate goods, so I refer to
total imports as the former variable and intermediate consumption as the latter variable.
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economic movements around the crisis period in Figure 3.9 and 3.10.
Figure 3.8: Simulation Result 1
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Note 1: Year zero is set to 2012Q1.
Note 2: The left vertical axis in graph (b) represents the basis point of ve-year government bond CDS.
Figure 3.8 depicts the transitions in debt-to-GDP ratio from three years before to
three years after the crisis and the probability of crisis and bond spread from three years
before to one year after the crisis. I set year zero to the rst quarter of 2012 at the time
that the debt crisis was most serious due to the Greek governments implementation of
a huge magnitude of debt restructuring in March. First of all, the debt-to-GDP ratio
in the simulation increases and the pace accelerates as the crisis is approaching. Then,
the government falls into the crisis with over 120% debt-to-GDP ratio and regains the
normal state probabilistically after the mandatory crisis period of two years. The graph
shows the average of all trials, so the decline in debt is moderate after the mandatory
crisis period, but the movement is quite drastic in each trial. The reason why the
simulation result is always higher than the data is that I collect cases going into the
crisis state. Even though a government is accumulating debts, it can lower the debts if
high TFP or low government consumption continues, but the model does not include
these cases. Besides, GDP hit the bottom ve or six quarters after the rst quarter
in 2012, and the debt-to-GDP ratio was unusually low from about 5 years before the
crisis because of the housing bubble.
Graph (b) reports the probability of crisis. I adopt the credit default swap (CDS)
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of ve-year government bonds as the alternative variable of probability of crisis in the
data. The simulation result shows the probability of crisis at less than ten percent until
one and a half years before the crisis, but then the rate surges, reaching over 80% just
before the crisis. In the data, after the 2008 global nancial crisis settled down, the
Spanish CDS was still low. However, fears around debt sustainability in some eurozone
countries after the extent of Greek debt manipulation was revealed in 2009 increased
the rate of CDS, exceeding 400 basis points in 2012. Graph (c) describes the bond
spread. Similar to the previous graph, the bond spread in the simulation begins to
increase rapidly one and a half years before the crisis, reaching more than 70% just
before the crisis, and the data also shows similar movement with CDS.
Next, Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show transitions in the main endogenous variables around
the crisis. The red dotted curve shows the actual movement of the Spanish economy,
and the black curve is the simulation result before and at the time of crisis, and the
blue and green solid curves are the recovery after the crisis, showing mandatory crisis
durations for two and zero years respectively. The upper left graph in Figure 3.9 shows
the transition of tax rates. Both the simulation and data keep gradually increasing
until the crisis. While the data continues increasing after the crisis, the increase in
simulation stops at the time of the crisis and begins to decrease after the mandatory
crisis period. Next, in fact, the amount of imports had been recovering from the
global nancial crisis until one year before the crisis, but it sank about 14% from
the maximum point before the crisis. In simulation, the amount of imports declines
about 10% due to the crisis. Thus, although the time it takes for the crisis e¤ects to
appear in imports is di¤erent in the data and the simulation, the magnitude is similar.
The output result also depicts similar declines in both data and simulation, decreasing
slightly more than 4% from three years before the crisis. The important feature of the
simulation result is that the output hits the bottom one quarter before the crisis for
two reasons. First, as the next graph of TFP shows, the sudden drop in TFP before
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Figure 3.9: Simulation Results 2
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the crisis contributes to an increase in the probability of crisis and decrease in the price
of government bonds, and that leads to increased issuance of government bonds and
the crisis. Second, the economic contraction related to the crisis state itself is not so
harsh in my model. As the graphs of tax rates and imported intermediate goods show,
the tax rate in the crisis state does not change much from the normal state and the
e¤ects of imported intermediate goods on production is at most about 10%. Mendoza
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Figure 3.10: Simulation Results 2 Cont.
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and Yue (2012) assume autarky as the punishment of default, so the external e¤ect
on the economy is strong, but my model assumes only a surge in interest rates for
working capital. Next, TFP decreases around the crisis in both data and simulation,
but the decline in data is larger than in the simulation. Government consumption,
which is another state variable, increases one period before the crisis and contributes
to the occurrence of the crisis in the next period. The data also shows the high level
of government consumption before the crisis. In terms of the simulation result for tax
revenue, the government increases it by raising the tax rate before the crisis. Then,
revenue decreases due to the lower levels of output around the crisis but increases again
because of the gradual recovery of output. The data shows constant increases in tax
revenue. The movement of the simulation result for GDP in the upper left graph in
Figure 3.10 is similar to that for output, but there are di¤erences: GDP hit the bottom
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at the time of the crisis due to the decrease in the amount of imported intermediate
goods, and crisis e¤ects on the economy in the data are slightly larger than in the
baseline simulation result. Also, the transition in householdsconsumption resembles
output and GDP. However, the nancial organizationsintervention negatively a¤ects
consumption, so the drop in consumption is larger than GDP. Domestic intermediate
goods had been constant in the data before the crisis, but it dropped sharply at the
time of the crisis. In the simulation, however, the decline of domestic intermediate
goods is only 2% at the time of crisis. Hours worked in the data are almost constant
around the crisis, but increases due to the crisis in the simulation. This is mainly
because nal goods rms supplement the shortage of intermediate goods with labor
inputs as I have shown in the decision rules in Figures 3.7.
Overall, it is possible to say that the model generally accommodates features of the
complicated movements of the actual debt crisis in Spain, capturing the magnitude of
crisis shock and stickiness. The biggest single di¤erence is that my model underesti-
mates the e¤ects of domestic inputs such as hours worked and domestic intermediate
goods. That implies that not only the restriction of imports of intermediate goods but
also domestic factors would amplify the e¤ects of a crisis23.
Alternative Scenario
In this section, I examine the e¤ect of mainly government-related policies on the econ-
omy by changing the values of six parameters. Table 3.3 shows the results of average
debt-to-GDP ratio, crisis frequency, average bond spread and changes of GDP in each
state of the economy from the baseline scenario and its decline from the normal state
to the crisis state.
Section (1) of Table 3.3 shows results that the cutback rate changes 10% points from
the 10% baseline cutback rate. The average debt-to-GDP ratio and crisis frequency
23For example, Acharya et al. (2014) emphasize the e¤ect of nancial contraction in the European
debt crisis.
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Table 3.3: Alternative Simulation Results
Average Crisis Average GDP
D/GDP Freq. Spread Normal Crisis Decline
Data 61.1% 0.60% 1.18% - - -6.19%
Baseline 47.0% 0.75% 5.78% - - -4.78%
(1) Cutback rate (: 0.1)
0.0: 48.3% 0.74% 0.0% 0.17% 1.98% -3.07%
0.2: 45.1% 0.74% 10.99% -0.05% -2.40% -7.02%
(2) Government Bond Criterion (B=GDP : 0.67)
0.52: 24.6% 0.35% 3.00% -0.73% -0.20% -4.27%
0.82: 71.8% 1.23% 9.12% 0.67% 0.06% -5.36%
(3) Tax revenue criterion (Rn=GDP : 0.38)
-5%: 100.7% 2.09% 18.45% 2.08% 0.12% -6.61%
+5%: 1.1% 0.01% 0.17% -1.73% 0.51% -2.61%
(4) Government consumption criterion (G=GDP : 0.219)
-5%: 9.2% 0.10% 1.01% -0.79% -0.32% -4.33%
+5%: 86.4% 1.71% 13.94% 0.86% 0.11% -5.49%
(5) Government transfer criterion (Z=GDP : 0.143)
-5%: 14.6% 0.18% 1.65% -0.17% 0.55% -4.10%
+5%: 79.5% 1.51% 11.83% 0.24% -0.52% -5.50%
(6) Recovery (Br: 50%)
1-cutback: 110.1% 2.43% 41.9% -0.50% 0.55% -3.78%
0% 16.1% 0.23% 1.91% 0.02% 0.05% -4.76%
Note: "Normal" and "Crisis" in the section on GDP represent GDP decline from the baseline and
the decline shows GDP decrease from the maximum value 3 years before the crisis.
are almost the same as the baseline result because the cut back rate does not a¤ect
the economy under the zero crisis probability time and the probability of crisis jumps
up just before one and a half years before the crisis. However, the bond spread takes
a high value as the cutback rate increases because of the low repayment at the time
of the crisis. Thus, the interest rate for working capital also increases, so the amount
of imports of intermediate goods declines and that leads to lower GDP in the crisis
state. Both sections (2) and (3) relate to the tax rate rule following equation (3.6).
The former section reports the case that the government bond criteria changes 15%
points from the baseline level of 67%, and the latter section shows the case that the
tax revenue criteria changes 5% from the baseline. The low value of government bonds
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and high value of tax revenue criteria represent the governments austerity attitude,
imposing a high tax rate on outputs, and the scal limit is also higher than the baseline
case. Thus, the average debt, crisis frequency and average spread are lower than in
the baseline case. However, this safe economy sacrices GDP in the normal state,
decreasing 0.73% and 1.73% from the benchmark respectively. GDP does not change
much in the crisis because the tax rate is exogenously given. Sections (4) and (5)
report results of 5% change of government consumption and transfer criteria from the
baseline respectively. The low values mean the government is taking an austerity policy
similar to the previous revenue side. Thus, low government consumption and transfer
economy lead to low debt-to-GDP ratios, crisis frequencies and bond spreads, and the
GDP levels are also lower than the baseline in the normal case. Transfers in the crisis
state negatively a¤ect GDP due to di¤erent aggregate resource constraints from the
normal state. Finally, I examine two cases in section (6) in which the government starts
with the amount of debt carried over during the crisis period Bct and zero debt amount
instead of the baseline value of 50% debt-to-GDP ratio when the government regains
the normal state from the crisis state. In the former case, the debt amount is too high
when the government regains the normal state, so the government falls into the crisis
again very quickly and the average debt-to-GDP ratio and average bond spread also
take high values. In the second case, if the government debt is zero when it regains the
normal state, these three statistics decline and the economy is more stable than in the
baseline case.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter proposes a sovereign debt crisis model which is applicable to an advanced
country. The model features the governments capability of repayment of its debts
rather than its willingness to repay as is assumed in the endogenous sovereign default
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model. Concretely, the government falls into debt crisis if its debt exceeds a scal
limit, and the scal limit is dened as the summation of discounted future primary
surplus when the government sets its tax rate on outputs to maximize tax revenue.
The contraction of the economy by the crisis is attributed to austerity measures and
a decline in intermediate goods importation due to high interest rates. Besides, a low
value of TFP amplies its e¤ect. The models compatibility to the Spanish debt crisis
is generally sound, capturing important features such as high debt-to-GDP ratio, crisis
frequency and moments of main variables. Also, the model is su¢ ciently exible to
examine a variety of government policies quantitatively.
This chapter merely provides a basic framework to analyze sovereign debt crises in
advanced countries. The crises are caused by many factors and cause many e¤ects on
the economy. It would be expected to deepen the analyses based on the framework.
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Chapter 4
A General Equilibrium Model of
Sovereign Debt Crisis in an
Advanced Country - The Case of
Foreign Debt -
4.1 Introduction
The Greek virtual default in 2012 had a signicant impact on the countrys economy.
Real GDP declined 26.5% in 2013 from the level before the nancial crisis and the
unemployment rate reached 27.5%. Although ve years has passed since the default,
the recovery of the economy is quite sluggish and the debt-to-GDP ratio remains high.
I proposed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the analysis
of sovereign debt crisis in advanced economies in the previous chapter. However, the
model is for economies with domestic bonds, so it is inappropriate to apply the model
for the analysis of the Greek crisis because the majority of its government bonds are
held by foreign countries. Thus, in this chapter I introduce a model of sovereign debt
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crisis in an advanced country for the case of foreign debt.
The modelling of foreign debts accompanies several modications from the previous
chapter. First of all, while domestic households purchase and price the government
bonds in the previous chapter, foreign investors play this role in the model. Thus, the
di¤erence between the repayment and acquisition of new bonds is the net outow of
output in this case. Second, the model introduces capital for householdsinter-temporal
utility maximization problem. In the previous chapter, households use government
bonds for their inter-temporal utility maximization and I abstract capital for simplicity
because the e¤ect of capital on the economy is small around nancial crises1. However,
the data suggests that capital cannot be ignored in this case due to the huge magnitude
of the Greek crisis. Finally, following Bi and Traum (2014), the model assumes that the
scal limit is drawn from the exogenous distribution depending on the debt-to-GDP
ratio. In the case of foreign debt, the government has less incentive to serve debts by
taking austerity measures to repay the debt than in the case of domestic debts.
The contraction of the economy by the crisis is caused by several paths. I assume
the country falls into nancial autarky in the state of crisis, so it is restricted from
importing intermediate goods which require working capital. Also, the international
nancial organizations force the government to impose an exogenous tax rate in return
for taking over a certain fraction of government debt. Finally, the lower capital return
decreases capital stock and that leads to a lower level of output.
I calibrate the model for the Greek economy in order to analyze its crisis around
2012, and the simulation results capture drastic movement in its economy such as
the high debt-to-GDP ratio, crisis frequency and economic contraction. The main
di¤erence is that my model overestimates the decrease in imported intermediate goods
and underestimates the decrease in domestic intermediate goods.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model to analyze the
1See Mendoza and Yue (2012).
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sovereign debt crisis for the case of foreign debts, focusing on the modication from the
previous chapter. Section 4.3 sets functional forms and calibrates parameters. Section
4.4 delivers the quantitative results: consisting of decision rules and simulation. Finally,
section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
The overall framework of the model is similar to the previous chapter. The model
is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium of a small open economy, consisting of
four domestic agents: households, nal goods rms, intermediate goods rms and a
government, and two foreign agents: foreign investors and foreign rms.
The government imposes taxes for nal output production, issues new bonds for
foreign agents, pays transfers to households and consumes nal goods. Households
provide labor force to both nal and intermediate goods rms and lend capital for
nal goods rms. They receive wages, the return of capital with interest and prots
from both types of rms, and receive government transfers. Intermediate goods rms
produce intermediate goods from householdslabor force. Final goods rms produce
output goods from imported and domestic intermediate goods, labor and capital. They
need to borrow working capital from foreign rms in order to import a certain fraction
of intermediate goods. In this foreign debt model, I assume the exogenous scal limit
depending on the previous debt outstanding because of less incentive to service debts. If
the debt amount exceeds the scal limit, the government falls into crisis. The transition
of normal and crisis states follows the previous chapter. I depict the overall ow of the
transaction in Appendix D.1.
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4.2.1 Government
The governments expenditure in the normal state consists of government consumption
Gt, transfers to households Zt and the repayment of government bonds Bt 1. Its
revenue consists of tax revenue Tt and new issuance of government bond Bt priced by
foreign investors as qt. Government bonds are characterized one period maturity, zero
coupon and non-contingent. Government bonds in the crisis state are rolled over until
it regains the normal state.
Government consumption is determined exogenously following to the process:
gt  (Gt  G)=GDP (4.1)
where gt is government consumption measured as the deviation from the steady state
criteria G standardized by the steady state GDP, which follows the AR(1) process:
gt = ggt 1 + "g;t (4.2)
where "g;t  N(0; 2g).
The amount of government transfer is decided following to the rule:
Zt = Z + 
z(eAt   eA) (4.3)
where Z and A are the steady state criteria of transfer and TFP respectively and
z( 0) is the elasticity of TFP to transfer. Similar to gt, TFP follows the AR(1)
process as:
At = AAt 1 + "A;t (4.4)
where "A  N(0; 2A). The governments tax revenue is determined as follows:
Tt =  tYt (4.5)
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where  t is the tax rate on output and Yt is nal output goods. For simplicity, I assume
the government imposes tax only on Yt.
In the normal state, the government set its tax rate depending on the previous
government bonds Bt 1 as:
 t =  + (Bt 1  B) (4.6)
where  and B are criteria of the tax rate and outstanding of government bonds
respectively and ( 0) is the elasticity of government bonds to the tax rate.
The issuance of new government bonds in the normal state is determined to balance
its budget:
qtBt = Bt 1 +Gt + Zt   Tt (4.7)
The government in the crisis state repays the remitted amount of debts to foreign
investors and issues the same amount of bonds. The remitted amount of bonds is
determined as Bt = (1   )Bt 1, where  is the exogenous cutback rate. In this case,
because the government budget constraint does not hold, the international nancial
organizations provide the amount of output IOt to satisfy the government constraint.
Thus, the government budget constraint in the case is Tt + IOt = Gt + Zt. Instead of
tax rule dened in the equation (4.6) in the normal state, the government are required
to set an exogenous xed tax rate from the international nancial organizations as:
 t = 
d (4.8)
The amount of bonds in the crisis state is rolled over until the government regains
the normal state. When the government recovers the normal state, the debt amount
is exogenously given to Br. The di¤erence between the amount of debt government
needs to repay and Br is covered by the international nancial organizations.
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4.2.2 Households
Households are innitely lived and derive utility from consumption Ct and disutility
from labor measured by hours worked Lt. They maximize the following utility maxi-
mization problem:
max
Ct;Lt;Kt
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu(Ct; Lt)
#
(4.9)
subject to
Ct + It = wtLt + rk;tKt +t + Zt (4.10)
Kt = It + (1  )Kt 1
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor of the household, and the utility function
u : R2+ ! R is continuous, twice di¤erential and satises @u@C > 0; @
2u
@C2
< 0; @u
@L
< 0,
@2u
@L2
< 0 and @
2u
@c2
@2u
@L2
   @u
@c
@u
@L
2
> 0. The rst equation is the households budget
constraint. The right-hand side of the equation consists of wages wtLt and the return
from capital holdings rk;tKt, prots t and government transfers. The left-hand side
is consumption and investment It. The second equation is the transition of capital.
Households allot investment It from their income and create new capital by combining
the depreciated previous capital (1 )Kt 1, where  is the depreciation rate of capital.
The rst-order conditions of the householdsoptimization problem are
wt =
uL(Ct; Lt)
uC(Ct; Lt)
(4.11)
rk;t = Et
uC(Ct+1; Lt+1)
uC(Ct; Lt)
(1 + rk;t   ) (4.12)
The householdsoptimization problem does not change due to the economic states
of normal or crisis.
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4.2.3 Final Goods Firms
Final goods rms produce output goods from intermediate goods Mt, labor force L
f
t
and physical capital Kt following the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = e
AtMMt (L
f
t )
LK1 M Lt (4.13)
They purchase intermediate goods from both domestic intermediate goods rmsmdt
and foreign rms mt , and obtain labor force L
f
t and borrow physical capital Kt with
its interest rate rk;t from households. The combination of technology of domestic and
imported intermediate goods follows the CES aggregator:
Mt =


1
 
 
mdt
  1
 + (1  ) 1 (mt )
  1
 
  
  1
(4.14)
where  is the Armington weight of domestic inputs and  is the parameter of substi-
tution elasticity. Then, the maximization problem of this rm is
max
mt ;mdt ;L
f
t ;Kt
ft = Yt(1   t)  ptmt   pmt mdt   wtLft   rk;tKt (4.15)
Both types of intermediate goods are a summation of the continuum of di¤erenti-
ated domestic and imported intermediate goods mdj;t;m

j:t following the Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator:
mdt 
Z 1
0
 
mdj;t
  1
 dj
 
 1
and mt 
Z 1

 
mj;t
  1
 dj +
Z 
0
 
mj;t
  1
 dj
 
 1
(4.16)
Final goods rms have to satisfy the working capital constraint for the importation of
a certain fraction  2 [0; 1] of intermediate goods:
t
1 + rt

Z 
0
pj;tm

j;tdj (4.17)
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where t is working capital, rt is the interest rate of working capital and p

j;t is the price
of imported intermediate inputs. From the cost minimization problem with respect to
imported intermediate goods and the assumption that the price of each unit of imported
intermediate goods pj;t is the numeraire, the aggregate price of imported intermediate
goods is
pt = [(1  ) + (1 + rt )1  ]
1
1  (4.18)
In the previous chapter, the interest rate on working capital rt is set to be equal
to the return of government bonds with the same marginal utility with respect to
current and next period consumption under the condition of denite occurrence of
crisis. However, following Mendoza and Yue (2012), I assume that rms in the crisis
state cannot import intermediate goods which are required for the working capital for
j 2 [0; ] in this model because the interest rate on working capital is innity (i.e.
rt ! 1) due to exclusion from world credit markets. Then, the aggregate price of
imported intermediate goods in the crisis state is
pt = [(1  )]
1
1  (4.19)
4.2.4 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods rms produce intermediate goods from labor force Lmt following to
the technology:
mdt = (L
m
t )
 (4.20)
where  2 [0; 1] is the labor inputs share for the production of intermediate goods. The
prot maximization problem of these rms is
max
Lmt
mt = p
m
t (L
m
t )
   wtLmt (4.21)
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The rst-order condition with respect to Lmt is
wt = p
m
t (L
m
t )
 1 (4.22)
4.2.5 Foreign Investors
Foreign investors are risk neutral and behave perfectly competitively. In the normal
state, they can receive the full amount of bonds issued in the previous period Bt 1 and
purchase new government bonds BFt with the price qt. However, if the government
falls into crisis, they receive a discounted amount of repayment (1   )Bt 1 from the
government, where  is the cutback rate of the repayment. It is uncertain that they
will be repaid the full amount for the bonds at time t, so their prot maximization
problem is
max
BFt
E0
1X
t=0
(
1
1 + rf
)t
f(1  Pc;t) + Pc;t(1  )gBt 1   qtBFt  (4.23)
where rf is the risk-free interest rate and Pc;t is the probability that the government is
in a crisis state during the period t. By taking the rst-order condition with respect
to BFt , the price of government bonds is derived as:
qt = Et
1
1 + rf
f(1  Pc;t+1) + Pc;t+1(1  )g (4.24)
In the case of crisis, foreign investors keep rolling over the discounted amount of repay-
ment (1 )Bt 1 until the government regains the normal state. When the government
recovers the normal state, the bond amount is exogenously given as Br.
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4.2.6 Crisis Scheme
Instead of the endogenous scal limit in the previous chapter, I assume that the scal
limit is drawn from an exogenous distribution depending on the previous debt amount.
If government bonds are held by domestic agents, the government has a higher incentive
to serve its debts by taking austerity measures, but the government does not have
such an incentive to serve its debts in the case of foreign debt. Of course, the lower
rate of the governments repayment of debts leads to higher interest rates, so the
government is not totally irresponsible of debt repayments. However, government
bonds of eurozone countries are treated as having the same secured level as German
bonds, so the governments scal control would be supercial. Therefore, instead of
the endogenous scal limit which is dened as the governments maximum capability
to serve its debt, I assume an exogenous scal limit in the case of foreign debts.
The government falls into crisis if the debt amount Bt 1 exceeds the scal limit
B

t . I assume that the scal limit B

t is drawn from an exogenous standard logistic
distribution. The transition of the crisis follows this process:
t =
8>><>>:
c;t if Bt 1 > B

t
n;t otherwise
(4.25)
where t = c;t and t = n;t indicate the crisis and normal states respectively. Fol-
lowing Bi and Traum (2014), I specify the probability that the government falls into
crisis in the next period as:
Et[Pc;t+1]  P (t+1 = c;t+1) =
exp(1 + 2Bt)
1 + exp(1 + 2Bt)
(4.26)
where 1 and 2 are parameters dening the shape of the cumulative distribution
function of crisis probability.
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4.2.7 Competitive Equilibrium
The state vector is summarized as St 2 fAt; gt; Kt 1; Bt 1; tg. At and gt are the
transitions of TFP and government consumption measured by the deviation from the
steady state criteria divided by steady state GDP respectively. Kt 1 and Bt 1 are
capital and the government bond carried over from the previous period respectively.
t is the government state at the beginning of period t.
Denition
A competitive equilibrium is dened as policy functions for private agents fC(S),K(S),
L(S),BF (S),md(S),m(S),Lf (S),Lm(S)g, prices fw(S),pm(S),rk(S)g, the government
plan of new issuance of government bonds Bt(A; g;K 1; B 1; n; n), the economic state
(B 1; n; B

) and the price of government bond q(B; n; n) such that:
(1) For (; ) = (n; n):
Given the price of government bond, the government plan of new issuance of
government bonds satises equation (4.7) and the market clearing condition of
government bonds.
(2) Households, nal and intermediate goods rms solve their problems respectively.
(3) The markets for domestic intermediate good and capital clear.
(4) The market for labor clears:
Lt= L
f
t+L
m
t (4.27)
(5) The market for nal goods clears as
for (t; t) = (n;t; n;t):
Yt   pndmt   (Bt 1   qtBt) = Ct + It +Gt (4.28)
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for (t; t) = (n;t; c;t) and t = c;t:
Yt   Tt   pdmt = Ct + It   Zt (4.29)
(6) For t = n;t:
The law of motion of transition of the economic state satises the equation
(4.25).
(7) For (t; t) = (n;t; n;t):
Given the crisis set and the probability of crisis, the price of government
bonds satises the foreign investors no-arbitage condition (4.24).
Explanation
In terms of condition (5), the government in the normal state acquires qtBt and
repays Bt 1 amount of goods from foreign investors, so net outow of resources to
foreign countries is Bt 1   qtBt. In the state of crisis, the net outow of goods is zero
and international nancial organizations intervene to balance the governments budget
IOt . Thus, the aggregate constraint of the economy is Yt  ptmt +IOt = Ct+ It+Gt.
By substituting the government budget equation Tt + IOt = Gt + Zt, the aggregate
resource constraint in the crisis state can be rewritten as is in the equation (4.29).
4.3 Functional Form and Calibration
The model is calibrated to the Greek data in the normal state from 1995 to 2007 and
in the crisis state from 2012 to 2014. I specify the householdsutility function as:
u(ct; Lt) = logCt   ! L
1+
t
1 + 
(4.30)
I adopt the same values on several parameters as in the previous chapter such as the
inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply , the Dixit-Stiglitz curvature parameter , the
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upper bound of imported inputs with working capital , the risk-free interest rate r,
the labor share in the production of intermediate goods  and the elasticity of tax rate
.
Although I set the value of the discount factor quite low in the previous chapter,
the value of this model is set to 0.99, which is standard for an RBC model. Next I
set the substitution elasticity between domestic and foreign intermediate goods  to
0.7 to capture the higher amount of decline of domestic intermediate goods and GDP
decline. The depreciation rate of capital  is 0.06 in order to target the return rate
of capital minus the depreciation rate; this is slightly higher than the risk-free interest
rate. From the Greek data, the persistence and standard deviation of government
expenditure shocks are 0:65 and 0:014 respectively and those of TFP shocks are 0:64
and 0:015 respectively. The intermediate input share in nal goods production M is
set to 0.42 from the OECDs STAN Input-Output data. I obtain the labor input share
in the production of output goods L to 0:41 from 70% of the rest of intermediate
goods. The Armington weight of domestic inputs  is calculated from the OECDs
STAN Input-Output data so that the proportion of imported intermediate goods to
GDP is 0:12. Next, in the normal period, the criteria of government consumption G,
government transfer Z, government debt B and tax rate  are set to be 0.083, 0.051,
0.327 and 0.343 respectively from the ratios of GDP to government consumption 0:240,
government transfers 0:147, government debt 1:07 and tax revenue 0:39. I set the
exogenous tax rate in the crisis period  d to 0:409 based on data that the governments
tax revenue over GDP Rd=GDP d reached about 48% in 2013 due to austerity measures.
I set the elasticity of transfers to productivity z to  0:137 from the OLS estimation.
Next, as in the previous chapter, I set the value of the cutback rate from the decline
in household assets. In fact, the haircut rate of Greek debt restructuring was about
60% (see Zettelmeyer et al. 2013). However, if investors expect this haircut rate, the
price of government bond will be much lower and the bond spread will be much higher
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than the actual economy. For example, if the probability of crisis is 30% under a 60%
cutback rate, the price of government bond is about 0.812 and the annual rate of risk
premium exceeds 120%. In order to avoid drastic movement in these two variables, I
refer to the decline in householdsassets. According to the OECD data, the average
households nancial assets per capita discounted by ination from 2010 to 2012 were
about 25% lower than the maximum value before the nancial crisis, so I set  to 0.25
as the baseline value.
Table 4.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Target/Source
: Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
: Substitution elasticity within intermediate goods 3 Feenstra et al. (2014)
: imported goods with working capital 0.7 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
r: Risk-free interest rate 0.01 Standard Value
: Labor input share in int. goods production 0.7 Standard Value
: Elasticity of tax 0.37 Bi (2012)
: Discount factor of households 0.99 Standard Value
 : Substitution elasticity across intermediate goods 0.7 Decline of int. goods and GDP
: Depreciation of capital 0.06 Interest rate of K (rk;t=0.075)
g: Persistence of govt expenditure shock 0.65 OECD
g: Standard deviation of govt expenditure shock 0.014 OECD
A: Persistence of TFP shock 0.64 OECD
A: Standard deviation of TFP shock 0.015 OECD
M : Intermediate input share in nal goods output 0.42 OECD
L: Labor input share in output of nal goods 0.41 Labor Share (70%)
: Armington weight of domestic inputs 0.6 OECD (m=GDP = 0:120)
G: Government expenditure criterion 0.083 OECD (G=GDP = 0:240)
Z: Government transfer criterion 0.051 OECD (Z=GDP = 0:147)
B: Government debt criterion 0.327 OECD (B=GDP = 1:07)
 : Tax rate criterion 0.343 OECD (Rn=GDP = 0:39)
 d: Tax rate criterion in the default state 0.409 OECD (Rd=GDP d = 0:48)
z: Elasticity of transfers to productivity -0.137 Estimation
: Cutback rate 0.25 Householdsnancial assets
(bl; pl): Fiscal limit shape, low probability (1.4, 0.3) Bi and Traum (2014)
(bh; ph): Fiscal limit shape, high probability (2.0. 0.999) Bi and Traum (2014)
Finally, following Bi and Traum (2014), I set the parameters of probability of crisis
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1 and 2 as
1 = ln

pl
1  pl

  2bl, 2 =
1
bl   bh ln

pl
ph
1  ph
1  pl

where bl and bh are the scal limit criteria of debt-to-GDP ratios, taking bl < bh. pl
and ph are the probability of falling into debt crisis corresponding to bl and bh. I set the
gap between bh and bl to 60% GDP, and ph and pl are 0.999 and 0.3 respectively from
Bi and Traum (2014). I set the lower and higher criteria of debt-to-GDP ratios bl and
bh to 140% and 200% because debt-to-GDP ratio was about 170% one quarter before
the crisis. Figure 4.1 shows the probability of crisis and price of government bonds
following equations (4.26) and (4.24) respectively. The black curve shows the baseline
scal limit, setting 30% crisis probability at 140% of debt-to-GDP ratio. The dotted
blue and red curves report the cases that the criteria shift 10% of debt-to-GDP ratio
from the baseline. I examine the cases of these two di¤erent values in the section on
sensitivity analysis.
Figure 4.1: Fiscal Limit
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Note: Debt-to-GDP ratios in the horizontal axis represent previous debt outstanding.
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4.4 Quantitative Results
4.4.1 Decision Rule
Figure 4.2 depicts the decision rule for government bonds. The red and pink curves
show newly issued government bonds at maturity base (Bt) and discounted base (qtBt)
respectively. There are two main di¤erences in the decision rule between the previous
chapter and this chapter. First, because of the high value of the discount factor, the
price of government bonds is high under the region of zero crisis probability. Thus, the
maturity base newly issued government bonds take close values to the discounted base.
Second, the gap between maturity base and discounted base is wider as the debt-to-
GDP ratio increases, exceeding the threshold of 130% of debt-to-GDP ratio because
the cutback rate is higher than in the previous chapter. As Figure 4.1 (b) shows
the price of government bonds declines sharply, but the government cannot reduce
the discount base of issuance of government bonds in order to satisfy the equation
qtBt = Bt 1 + Gt + Zt   Tt. Thus, the government needs to repay a higher level of
government bonds in the next period.
Figure 4.2: Decision Rule of Government Bond
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Figure 4.3 describes the decision rules of the main endogenous variables. The black
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Figure 4.3: Decision Rule
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curve and the red lines show the normal and crisis cases under the steady state of TFP,
government consumption and capital stock. The blue and green curves correspond to
high government consumption and low TFP under the normal government state, and
the pink dotted line is low TFP under the crisis state.
First of all, the tax rate in the crisis state is always higher than the normal state
under 200% of debt-to-GDP ratio because of the high exogenous tax rate in the crisis
state. Next, imported intermediate goods decline dramatically due to the crisis. In
the case of 150% of debt-to-GDP ratio, the amount drops more than 50% under the
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steady state case. These two e¤ects, the high tax rate and low amount of imported
intermediate goods, are the main causes of output decline in the crisis. The amount of
output declines about 15% from the normal to the crisis state in the case of 150% of
debt-to-GDP ratio. Tax revenue in the crisis state is higher than in the normal state
under about 190% of debt-to-GDP ratio in the steady state because the high tax rate
outweighs the low output. The GDP di¤erence between the crisis and normal states
does not change so much from output because although the amount of imports is low
in the crisis state, their price is higher than in the normal state. Next, the movement of
consumption is highly non-linear in the normal state. Because the government bonds
are held by foreign investors, the outow of output goods reduces by the amount
of Bt 1   qtBt. Thus, as the price of government bond decreases and the maturity
base repayment increases, the amount of outow is larger and domestic consumption
shrinks. In the crisis state, the consumption level is the almost same regardless of TFP
because the low tax revenue sustains the amount of consumption. Next, wages are a
the function of consumption and labor as equation (4.11) shows, so wages declines as
consumption declines. The decision rules of domestic intermediate goods and labor
measured in hours worked are straightforward. Although the low TFP does not a¤ect
hours worked much, these two variables increase in high government consumption and
decreases in a crisis.
4.4.2 Simulation Results
I generate stochastic TFP processes 2000 times for 500 periods, truncating the rst
100 periods in order to invalidate the e¤ects of initial conditions2. After the two-year
mandatory crisis period, the government has an opportunity to regain the normal state
with 0.083% probability every period, which is widely used in the endogenous default
model.
2I set the initial condition of the economy as the normal state of the government, steady state of
TFP, government consumption and capital stock, and 30% of debt-to-GDP ratio.
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Baseline Results
Table 4.2 shows the results of the baseline simulation, focusing on the average debt-to-
GDP ratio, crisis frequency (default frequency in data), average bond spread and the
correlations of GDP with important variables. Unlike the endogenous default model,
the model replicates the high debt-to-GDP ratio (97.2%), which is close to the actual
Greek ratio (106.7%). The probability of crisis reports are also similar to the data
value, showing 0.55% per quarter in the baseline simulation and 0.53% in the data.
The average bond spread is higher than the data mainly due to the 25% cutback rate
of government bonds. The second half of Table 4.2 shows correlations between GDP
and the main variables. Output, consumption and imported and domestic intermediate
goods show quite high relations with GDP in both the data and the simulation. In
terms of hours worked, similar to the Spanish case, the GDP relation with hours worked
is negative due to the downward trend in working time. However, labor input is highly
related to GDP in the simulation. Next, while the tax rate is almost irrelevant with to
GDP in the data, the simulation result shows a negative relation between tax rate and
GDP because high tax rates decrease output. Tax revenue indicates a high relation to
GDP in the data, but the simulation shows quite a low relation because the e¤ects of
output and tax rate o¤set each other.
Figure 4.4: Simulation Result 1
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Note: The left vertical axis in graph (b) represents the basis point of ve-year government bond CDS.
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Table 4.2: Simulation Results
Data Baseline
Average Debt/GDP 106.7% 97.2%
Default/Crisis Frequency 0.53% 0.55%
Average Bond Spread 2.27% 9.44%
The correlation with GDP
-Output 99.6% 99.8%
-Consumption 98.5% 94.6%
-Imported Intermediate Goods 92.8% 98.9%
-Domestic Intermediate Goods 99.3% 94.4%
-Hours Worked -69.7% 79.2%
-Tax Rate 7.55% -87.0%
-Tax Revenue 96.4% 5.1%
Note 1: The average debt-to-GDP ratio is the period of the non-default state.
Note 2: The Greek government had experienced default four times since 1829.
Note 3: Bond spread in data is 10-year government bond premium toward the yields of German bonds, while that
in simulation represents the annual rate of reciprocal of government bond price minus the world risk-free
interest rate.
Next, Figure 4.4 depicts the transition of debt-to-GDP ratio, probability of crisis
and bond spread from four years to one quarter before the Greek governments virtual
default in the rst quarter of 2012. The debt-to-GDP ratio in data is always higher
than in the simulation before the crisis, but both ratios are increasing with rapid pace
as the crisis approaches. The simulation result for the probability of crisis was lower
than 10% one year before the crisis, but the rate jumps up signicantly within one year.
The data also shows a similar result in that the CDS begins to increase about one year
before the crisis. The bond spread in the simulation corresponds to the probability of
default, so the rate surges from one year before the crisis. The bond spread in the data
also begins to increase about two years before the crisis, with uctuation.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the transitions of the main endogenous variables around
the crisis. The red dotted curve is the data for the actual Greek economy, and the
black curve shows the simulation results before and at the time of crisis, and the blue
and green curves are the simulation result of recovery after the crisis, representing
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Figure 4.5: Simulation Results 2
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mandatory crisis periods of two and four years respectively. The simulation result
generally captures the important features of the actual Greek crisis such as GDP (gure
h) and tax revenue (gure g). I set the two-year mandatory crisis duration as the
baseline, but the result of the four-year simulation is more compatible with the data
because the level of actual GDP has been stagnant since the crisis. Output (gure c)
is decreasing in debt-to-GDP during the crisis period because the return from capital
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Figure 4.6: Simulation Results 2 Cont.
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holdings is low during the crisis period, so the stock of capital is diminishing due to
depreciation. Government consumption (gure e) is di¤erent between the data and the
simulation. The Greek government needed to take drastic scal austerity measures,
and government consumption decreased by about 25% after the crisis from the level of
three years before the crisis. In my simulation, I calibrated the parameters of exogenous
government consumption from the normal state, then proceeded to the crisis state.
114
Thus, the government consumption e¤ect is underestimated in the simulation. This
di¤erence suggests that government behavior in the crisis state should be transformed
from the normal state. On the other hand, following Mendoza and Yue (2012), I assume
nancial autarky from the world credit market in the crisis state, but the simulation
result (gure b) overestimates the e¤ect of the decline of imported intermediate goods.
The decline in domestic intermediate goods in the data (gure j) is more severe than
that in the simulation.
Alternative Scenario
Table 4.3: Alternative Simulation Results
Average Crisis Average GDP
D/GDP Freq. Spread Non-def Def Decline
Data 106.7% 0.53% 2.27% - - -22.32%
Baseline 97.2% 0.55% 9.44% - - -20.54%
(1) Cutback rate (:0.25)
0.15: 99.3% 0.33% 8.86% 0.18% -0.03% -20.79%
0.35: 95.4% 0.73% 10.05% 1.08% 0.32% -21.32%
(2) Government Bond Criterion (B=GDP : 1.07)
0.92: 84.1% 0.01% 8.11% -1.43% -0.82% -19.64%
1.22: 95.6% 1.64% 11.33% 2.77% 0.56% -22.46%
(3) Tax revenue criterion (Rn=GDP : 0.39)
-5%: 96.1% 2.05% 11.97% 3.36% 0.12% -23.26%
+3%: 82.34% 0.01% 8.10% -0.74% -0.41% -20.11%
(4) Government consumption criterion (G=GDP : 0.240)
-5%: 82.6% 0.01% 8.10% -0.14% 0.23% -20.44%
+5%: 97.0% 1.63% 11.27% 1.71% 0.03% -22.01%
(5) Government transfer criterion (Z=GDP : 0.147)
-5%: 89.7% 0.07% 8.36% 0.87% 0.87% -20.33%
+5%: 97.9% 1.26% 10.68% 0.61% -0.76% -21.78%
(6) Recovery (Br: 30%)
1-cutback: 108.7% 1.17% 11.31% -2.28% -1.42% -19.59%
0% 95.2% 0.53% 9.37% 0.68% 0.19% -21.03%
Note: "Normal" and "Crisis" in the section on GDP represent GDP decline from the baseline and
the decline shows GDP decrease from the maximum value 3 years before the crisis.
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Table 4.3 shows the crisis e¤ects on the economy by changing six parameters mainly
related to government policies. First, section (1) shows the cases of di¤erent cutback
rates. A low cutback rate reduces the probability of crisis because the amount of
government bonds that the government has to issue will be lower than the baseline
under the risky debt region. Corresponding to the crisis frequency, the average bond
spread also declines from the baseline level. Sections (2) and (3) report changes in
revenue criteria. The criteria of low government bond and high tax revenue induce
high tax rates, and that leads to low debt-to-GDP ratio, crisis frequency and bond
spread. However, high tax rates sacrice the level of GDP. Next, sections (4) and (5)
show the results of di¤erent criteria of government expenditure. The austerity policy,
and the low government consumption and transfers, also lead to low debt-to-GDP
ratio, crisis frequency and bond spread. Finally, section (6) reports di¤erent cases of
the governments debt when it regains the normal state. If the government regains the
normal state with the amount of debt outstanding remitted by the cutback rate at the
time of crisis, the amount of debts is too high and the economy becomes less stable
as the high debt-to-GDP ratio and crisis frequency shows. However, even though the
government regains the normal state with zero debt, the economy does not become
especially stable because the government rapidly increases its debts due to the low tax
rate.
4.5 Conclusion
I provide the DSGE model to analyze sovereign debt crises in advanced countries in
which government bonds are held by foreigners. Based on the previous chapter, the
model requires three modications due to the introduction of foreign debts. First,
the di¤erence between the governments repayment and the issuance of new bonds
is the net outow of domestic output. Second, instead of government bonds, capital
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is introduced for inter-temporal utility maximization. The diminishing capital stock
during the crisis decreases output. Finally, the scal limit is drawn from the exogenous
distribution depending on the debt outstanding.
I calibrate the Greek economy for the analysis of the countrys debt crisis around
2012. The compatibility of the model to the actual Greek crisis is generally sound, cap-
turing the high debt-to-GDP ratio, crisis frequency and economic contraction. How-
ever, the model overestimates the decline in imported intermediate goods and under-
estimates the path of domestic contraction. This suggests that it would be important
to consider how the domestic path amplies the e¤ects of debt crises in the future
research.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This thesis consists of three chapters which focus on the development of a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model to analyze sovereign debt crises. I summarize the
main points of the economic model and important ndings in this concluding chapter.
Then, I discuss opportunities for future research.
In Chapter 2, I incorporate nancial intermediaries into the framework of the dy-
namic general equilibrium model of endogenous sovereign default. The main feature
of the model is the contingency of the default state from the non-default state because
government bonds become non-performing by the decision of default and nancial in-
termediaries have to eliminate a certain proportion of these non-performing bonds from
their net worth. This characteristic make it possible to quantify the nancial contrac-
tion e¤ect on the economy. In addition to this, the model captures the phenomenon of
"Too-Big-to-Default". A government which accumulates a large amount of debts may
choose not to default due to the high damage to the economy. The simulation result
captures important features of the Argentinean default in 2001 such as debt-to-GDP
ratio, frequency of crisis and contraction of the economy.
The endogenous default model is not applicable to advanced countries because the
government is assumed to be able to estimate the e¤ect of default precisely and its e¤ect
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has to be small and short, and also the model replicates only relatively low amounts
of debt outstanding. Thus, in Chapter 3, I propose a new model of sovereign debt
crisis in an advanced country. The model assumes the governments incapability to
repay its debts rather than its willingness. If government debt outstanding exceeds an
endogenous scal limit, the government falls into crisis. The model denes the scal
limit as the summation of discounted future primary surplus under the tax rate to
maximize the governments tax revenue. In the crisis state, the government is forced
to impose an exogenous tax rate and the amount of imported intermediate goods
declines because of the increase of interest rate of working capital for the purchase of
a certain fraction of these imports. The simulation result of the model can replicate
high debt-to-GDP, and the models compatibility with the debt crisis in Spain in 2012
is generally sound.
In Chapter 4, I introduce foreign bonds based on the model in Chapter 3 for the
analysis of a country where the majority of bonds are held by foreign countries. In
the model, because of the foreign investorspurchase of government bonds, they price
the government bonds and the net outow of domestic output occurs. I introduce
capital, instead of government bonds, for the maximization of inter-temporal utility.
Also, the scal limit is drawn from the exogenous distribution due to the governments
lower incentive to serve its debts. I calibrate the Greek debt crisis in around 2012.
The model overestimates external e¤ects and underestimates the domestic contraction
e¤ects of the amplication of the crisis, but it explains the overall movement around
the crisis.
Two directions for future research are proposed. The rst direction is to extend
the current debt crisis models to be adoptable for the analysis of actual debt crises.
Sovereign debt crises are caused by many factors and a¤ect the economy in many
ways, so it is extremely intricate to capture the mechanism. However, I would like to
shed light on debt crises from many angles. The next direction is policy implications.
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According to Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2013), there are ve ways to decrease the debt-to-
GDP ratio: economic growth, austerity measures, default or restructuring, ination
surprise and nancial repression. I would like to investigate which policy is achievable
and minimizes social welfare loss under di¤erent countrieseconomic environments.
I research the sovereign debt crisis not for academic achievement or curiosity but
to contribute to people and society. Today, many countries accumulate massive public
debts, and some of them are projected to be unsustainable. I am apprehensive of the
consequences of these high debts, because sovereign debt crisis could ultimately be a
matter of lives. I hope from the bottom of my heart that research into sovereign debt
crises proceeds further and nds ways to minimize negative e¤ects on the economy.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Data in Figure 1.1
 Public Debt-to-GDP Ratio: Government debts are measured in gross. The data
source from 1990 to 2005 is the historical public debt database (September 2012
version), IMF Fiscal A¤airs Department. The data source from 2006 to 2021 is
IMF Fiscal Monitor (October 2016 version).
 Dependency Ratio: This ratio is dened as (population aged 65 years or over) /
(population aged 20 to 64 years) in the graph. The data source is OECD.
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Appendix B
Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Diagrams
Figure B.1: The Sketch of My Model
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Figure B.2: Timing
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B.2 Computational Algorithm
I solve the model using the discrete state space (DSS) with a two-loop algorithm. The
outside loop is the price of government bonds consistent with each state space, and
the inside loop is the iteration of government value functions in both non-default and
default states. In order to obtain precise results, I apply linear interpolation to the
government bonds.
<Flow of Programming>
1. Discretize the state space of TFP (A) and total government bonds (b). I use
Tauchens method (1986) to gain the state space of TFP, following equation
(2.5). I set the center point to zero and the width to three standard deviations
and take 25 discrete grid points. Also, I uniformly generate 51 discrete grid points
of government bonds within the range of [bmax; 0].
2. Initialize the government value functions V nd0 (A; b) and V
d
0 (A; b) and the govern-
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ment bond price q0(A; b0). The initial guess of government price is q0 = 1=rd.
3. The governments value function iteration.
(a) Solve the government optimal debts b0 by using the global search procedure
in each non-default state matrix of A and b so as to be consistent with the
competitive equilibrium of private agents.
(b) Obtain allocations, prices and utilities in each state matrix of A and b1.
(c) Calculate updated value functions V nd1 (A; b) and V
d
1 (A; b).
(d) If the di¤erence between current and updated government value functions in
each non-default and default case is small enough (i.e. supfV nd1 (A; b)  V nd0 (A; b),V d1 (A; b)  V d0 (A; b)g < "g), stop the iteration. Otherwise, go back to pro-
cedure (a) with the updated government value functions.
4. Calculate the default set  A(b), the probability of default e(A; b0) and the gov-
ernment bond price q1(A; b0).
5. If the di¤erence between current and updated government bond prices is a small
enough value (i.e. supjjq1(A; b0)  q0(A; b0)jj < "g), stop the iteration. Otherwise,
go back to procedure 3 with the updated government bond prices.
B.3 The Assumption of Exogenous Proportion of
Domestic Bond Holding
I assume the proportion of domestic nancial intermediariesgovernment bond hold-
ings over debt outstanding is exogenously determined for the following three reasons.
1In the default state, b represents non-performing bonds. That is, the value of each grid point of
b is multiplied by the proportion of domestic agents bond holding (v) and the haircut rate (h).
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First, governments often intervene in domestic nancial intermediariesportfolio allo-
cations in sovereign debt crises. Becker and Ivashina (2014) investigate the relationship
between governments and banks during the European sovereign debt crisis and point
out that the governments urged their domestic banks to hold newly issued government
bonds through the intervention of banksmanagement, especially in countries which
accumulated massive public debts and exposed high sovereign default risk such as in
Greece and Italy. Similar to the European debt crisis, the governments intervention
toward banks was also observed in Argentina before the government o¢ cially defaulted
in December 2001. Domestic nancial intermediaries were practically enforced to con-
clude the reduction of interest payments and extension of bondsmaturities with the
(unreliable) guarantee of future tax income2, although the Argentinean government
stressed it was "voluntary" debt restructuring. Thus, nancial intermediaries could
not freely choose the amount of bond holdings around the default period.
The second reason is that the proportion of domestic debt has been a narrow value
rage of narrow over a long period. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011) provide data that the
ratio of domestic agents to total central government debt has been shifting in a range
between about 80% and 95% in advanced countries and 40 to 60% in emerging countries
since the 1960s.
The nal reason is the limitation of obtaining the inner solution within the frame-
work of an endogenous sovereign default model. As Arellano (2008) points out, the risky
borrowing region (the default probability is between 0% and 100%) is quite narrow, so
the price of government bonds would take corner solutions in most economic states.
In other words, if nancial intermediaries can choose the amount of government bonds
at+1 2 [0; bt+1] freely, they will hold the maximum amount of bonds at+1 =  bt+1 or
at+1 = 0 in most cases and the region to take at+1 2 (0; bt+1) will be limited. Even
though I introduce additional assumptions on nancial intermediariesportfolios such
2See International Monetary Fund (2004).
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as theValue-at-Risk constraint or portfolio theories of risk diversication, they would
contribute little to obtaining the inner solutions.
B.4 Financial IntermediariesOptimization Prob-
lem
In this appendix, I derive the nancial intermediariesrst-order conditions including
lending cost functions in both non-default and default states, and explain the economic
interpretations. The nancial intermediariesmaximization problem in the non-default
state (2.14) substituting the lending cost function (2.35) is as follows.
max
kst ;dt
FIt = r
k
t k
s
t + at   qtat+1   rddt  
2641kst + 22
n
kst  

n
Arg
  qtat+1
o2
kst
375 (B.1)
The constraints are the equality of balance sheet (2.15) and the capital adequacy
requirement (2.16). The rst-order conditions of nancial intermediariesoptimization
problems in the non-default state are:
rkt = r
d + 1 +
2
kst

kst  

n
Arg
  qtat+1

+ ndt n(k
s
t + qtat+1)
 2 (B.2)
0  ( n
kst + qtat+1
  ) ? ndt  0 (B.3)
where ndt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (2.16).
Similarly, their maximization problem in the default state (2.17) with lending cost
function (2.36) is
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The rst-order conditions of nancial intermediaries optimization problems in the
default state are:
rkt = r
d + 1 +
2
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  3

+ dtn
d
t (k
s
t )
 2 (B.5)
0  (n
d
t
kst
  ) ? dt  0 (B.6)
where dt represents the Lagrange multipliers associated with the capital adequacy
constraint in the default state (2.19).
Equations (B.2) and (B.5) indicate the decision rules of interest rates in the non-
default and default states respectively. The interest rates in both cases are determined
by four terms: the risk-free interest rate (the rst term), base premium on lending (the
second term), deviation from the criteria (the third term) and the additional premium
in the case that the capital adequacy ratio hit the constraint (the fourth term). With
respect to the third term, the interest rate is an increase function on lending, so it
will be costly for goods producing rms to acquire working capital. The interest rate
in the default state is higher than in the non-default state under the same TFP level
because the lending criteria in the default state are lower than in the non-default
state. Also, if the risk weight on government bonds is strictly larger than zero in
the non-default state, the interest rate increases as the expenditure for newly issued
government bonds qtat+1 increases. With respect to the fourth term, the Lagrange
multipliers take strictly positive values if the capital adequacy ratio hits the minimum
requirement constraint ( = 0:115), so the interest rate on lending is higher than
in the unconstrained case. Equations (B.3) and (B.6) are complementary conditions
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regarding to the capital adequacy constraint in each the non-default and default states.
B.5 Debt Restructuring
The Argentinean debt restructuring was extremely intricate. There were ve main
restructures around the default in December 2001. Moreover, government bonds con-
sisted of 152 series, eight governing laws and six di¤erent currencies at the time of
default. Thus, each bond had di¤erent haircut rates applied, di¤erent currencies af-
fected the real value of bonds and debt restructuring lawsuits proceeded under di¤erent
laws when bond holders did not agree on haircut rates and sued the Argentinean gov-
ernment.
The rst debt restructuring was implemented in June 2001. The government ex-
tended the maturities of its bonds equivalent to 29 billion dollars in order to reduce
short-term repayments. However, that caused higher debt obligation in the medium
and longer terms. In November 2001, the government needed to reduce repayments
again due to low tax revenue. This debt restructuring was originally designed in two
phases: phase 1 for domestic agents and phase 2 for foreign lenders, but phase 2 was
not implemented because the government chose default soon after phase 1 took place.
The government reduced its interest payments and extended maturities again in the
phase 1 debt restructuring. This exchange was backed by a nancial transaction tax,
and Standard & Poors graded the restructuring as "selective default". After the de-
fault in December 2001, the government exchanged dollar-based domestic bonds into
peso-based due to the abandonment of the xed exchange rate.
In 2005, the government implemented full-scale debt restructuring, achieving about
71% to 75% haircut rates3 toward approximately 76% defaulted bonds. Edwards (2015)
states that this haircut rate was "excessively high". In order to compensate for the
high rate, the government granted GDP-indexed warrants, which were contingent on
3See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006).
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GDP level and growth. The value of this warrant was equivalent to only about 2
cents in a dollar in February 2005. However, the value increased signicantly because
of the rapid recovery of the Argentinean economy. Thus, the real haircut rate would
be considered to be lower than the original haircut rate due to the benet from this
warrant.
The next debt restructuring was held in 2010 for holdouts. Although the deal
in 2010 was less attractive than in 2005 because of missing the opportunity to ob-
tain repayments of GDP warrants, the majority of creditors agreed to exchange their
defaulted bonds. The participation rate reached 91% of the defaulted bonds.
After that, the Argentinean government neglected holdouts. However, some hold-
outs led a lawsuit against the government under the U.S. jurisdiction. In June 2014,
because the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case, a lower court determined
that the Argentinean government must pay full principal plus interest to the plainti¤s.
In addition to this, the court prohibited proceeding to payments of restructured bonds
unless the government had completed paying for them. Because the government did
not obey the courts decision and rejected these payments, it fell into (technical) default
after the one month grace period4.
Because not only Argentina but also many other defaulted countries such as Greece
had faced di¢ culties in dealing with debt restructuring, the UNCTAD (UN General
Assembly, 2015) set nine principles for debt restructuring: sovereignty, good faith,
transparency, impartiality, equitable treatment, sovereign immunity, legitimacy, sus-
tainability and majority restructuring. Based on these principles, international orga-
nizations are expected to build frameworks to settle their debt restructuring problems.
4Unlike other typical defaults, the Argentinean government had the resources and willingness to
disburse payments, so this case can be categorized as "technical default".
134
B.6 Sensitivity Analysis
I have already reported di¤erent values for several parameters such as the haircut rate
(h), the proportion of domestic bond holdings (v), and the maximum debt amount in
the alternative scenario section. In this appendix, I examine the sensitivity analysis by
changing the values of several parameters: the discount factor of households (), the
probability of recovering the non-default state (#), the average capital adequacy ratio
(Arg) and the extra penalty on lending by default (3). The main results are in Table
B.1. The rst and second rows show the data and baseline results respectively.
Table B.1: Sensitivity Analysis
Average Default Average Decline Lending
Debt/GDP Frequency Bond Spread Y C L Interest Rate
Data 37.06% 0.77% 1.92% -10.56% -17.31% -27.94% 17.50%
Baseline 33.13% 0.71% 0.19% -16.15% -16.34% -26.44% 9.76%
(1) Discount factor (0.88)
 = 0:84 32.15% 1.29% 0.32% -15.70% -16.47% -26.50% 10.62%
 = 0:92 34.29% 0.30% 0.04% -17.85% -18.10% -28.62% 9.93%
(2) Probability of recovering non-default (0.044)
# = 0:030 34.49% 0.50% 0.08% -17.46% -18.02% -28.94% 10.62%
# = 0:083 28.34% 1.59% 0.39% -14.99% -15.54% -25.02% 9.89%
(3) The average capital adequacy ratio (0.146)
Arg = 0:13 15.73% 2.20% 0.86% -10.21% -10.11% -17.64% 7.33%
Arg = 0:15 34.86% 0.13% 0.03% -19.00% -19.64% -30.14% 10.52%
(4) Extra penalty on lending in the default state (1.2)
3 = 1:08 31.49% 0.93% 0.26% -14.98% -15.06% -24.34% 9.15%
3 = 1:32 34.45% 0.43% 0.08% -17.90% -18.35% -29.24% 10.49%
Note 1: Y, C and L represent output, consumption and lending respectively.
Note 2: Parentheses in each section represent baseline values.
Section (1) reports that the discount factor changes 0:04 points from the baseline
value of 0:88. Changing this parameter a¤ects the behavior of government in two ways.
In the case of  = 0:92 (i.e. the government is more farsighted), the government is
more reluctant to compensate for current low consumption by the issuance of bonds
and is less likely to choose default to reduce the burden of its debt. These two e¤ects
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o¤set each other and average debt-to-GDP increases only about 1% point from the
baseline case. The default frequency and average bond spread decline from the baseline
case because the latter e¤ect of avoidance of default is larger than the former e¤ect.
However, the economic impact on default will be larger than the baseline because
the government defaults with more debts and the amount of non-performing bonds is
larger. This phenomenon is implied for advanced economies. It would be considered
that the discount factor in these countries is higher than for developing economies
due to low interest rates, so this is one reason that these governments are less likely
to choose default. The e¤ects of default on advanced economies are larger than the
developing economies.
In the second section (2), I examine the cases of lower (# = 0:030) and higher
(# = 0:083) probability of recovering the non-default state than the baseline case
(# = 0:044). The higher value at 0:083 is the median duration to regain partial market
access according to the analysis by Dias and Richmond (2008). When # is 0:083, the
government knows it can recover the non-default state from the default state earlier
than the baseline case. Thus, the default value increases and the government chooses
default more frequently. Besides, the government chooses default with lower level of
debts, so nancial intermediaries eliminate lower levels of non-performing bonds. Thus,
the default e¤ects on the economy are lower than in the baseline case.
Section (3) shows the changes in the average capital adequacy ratio Arg. If this
value lowers from 14.6% to 13.0%, nancial intermediaries increase the amount of
lending in both non-default and default states, but the e¤ect on the latter state is
larger than in the former state. Thus, the default e¤ects on main variables such as
output, consumption and lending are smaller than the baseline. However, these e¤ects
increase the default frequency from 0.71% to 2.20% per quarter due to the lower e¤ect
of default. The average debt-to-GDP is about half of the baseline case because the
government chooses default with lower debts. When the parameter increases to 0.15,
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the e¤ect on the economy is opposite to the case of lower value. I also examine the
cases that the minimum capital adequacy ratio  and risk weight on government bonds
 are higher than the baseline case, but the capital adequacy constraints in the both
non-default state (2.16) and default state (2.19) hit the upper bound only in the case
of lower TFP. Thus, the results do not change much around the default period.
Section (4) reports results for di¤erent values of extra penalty on lending in the
default state 3. The low value on this parameter mitigates the e¤ect of nancial
contraction by default, so the decrease in lending by default becomes smaller than the
baseline. Thus, declines in output and consumption are also lower, the interest rate
decreases and the default frequency and bond spread increase from the baseline case.
B.7 Data in Figure 2.4
 GDP: The data is quarterly gross domestic product of the expenditure approach,
xed PPPs, seasonally adjusted. The source is OECD.
 Lending and Consumption: I calculate seasonally adjusted real lending and con-
sumption from nominal raw data by subtracting ination and seasonal e¤ects.
The method of seasonal adjustment is X-12-ARIMA, and the ination data is the
seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP deator. The denition of lending is nan-
cial institutionscredit to the private sector measured in peso. The denition of
nominal consumption is quarterly household consumption expenditure, nominal
annualized rate and measured in peso. The data source of lending is the Central
Bank of Argentina and both nominal consumption and ination are International
Financial Statistics.
 Interest rate on lending: The data source is International Financial Statistics.
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C.1 Diagrams
Figure C.1: The Sketch of My Model
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Figure C.2: Timing
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Note 1: Brackets represent the amount of government debt.
Note 2: Bct represents the debt outstanding in the crisis state.
C.2 Computational Algorithm
I obtain the scal limit rst, and derive the discrete state space of the model by using
the scal limit as one of the state variables.
<Fiscal Limit>
I adopt the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation in order to calculate
the distribution of scal limit.
Flow of Programming
1. Discretize the state space of the tax rate (), TFP (A) and government con-
sumption in deviation from steady state normalized by GDP (g). I set the tax
rate between 0.15 and 0.851 and uniformly take 300 grid points. I use Tauchens
method (1986) to gain the state space of TFP and government consumption,
following equations (3.4) and (3.2). In both variables, I take 31 grid points uni-
formly, setting the center points to zero.
1This is because if the tax rate is close to one, the rst-order conditions of nal goods rms will not
hold due to negative prots after tax. Also, if the tax rate is too low, the scal limit will be negative
because of low tax revenue. Therefore, I restrict the tax rate to between 0.15 and 0.85.
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2. Calculate values of endogenous variables (Ct; Lt; wt;Mt;mt ;m
d
t ; L
f
t ; L
m
t ; Zt; Tt; Gt; Yt; p
m
t ; p

t )
for each tax rate and state variable given the interest rate of working capital rt ,
which is equivalent to rf by using equations (3.1)(3.3)(3.5)(3.13)(3.16)(3.17)(3.21)-
(3.23)(3.28)(3.31)(3.33)(3.37)(3.38).
3. Find the tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue in each state variable.
4. Draw the future shocks of these two variables (At+i; gt+i) given the initial state
(At; gt) and calculate scal surplus for i = 1;    ; 200. Then, aggregate the
discounted future scal surplus following the denition of scal limit (3.42).
5. Repeat procedure 4 for 2000 times for all initial states of (At; gt)
6. Take the average of the all simulations for the scal limit and calculate the
cumulative density function of crisis probability.
<Discrete State Space>
I separately calculate the normal and crisis states. In terms of the crisis state, I
solve the endogenous variables of current and expected values in the next period for
each grid point of (At; gt):
In the normal state, following Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004), I nd a xed
point in the decision rule for government bonds by using the monotone map method
as Bt = f b(At; gt; Bt 1). From the budget constraint of government (3.7), the price of
government bonds is
qt =
Bt 1 +Gt + Zt   Tt
f b(At; gt; B 1)
(C.1)
Also from the householdsoptimization problem (3.14) and the specication of utility
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function (3.43), the price of government bonds is
qt = Et
C(At; gt; Bt 1)
C(At+1; gt+1; f b(At; gt; Bt 1); Bmaxt+1 )
(C.2)
 (1  Pc(At+1; gt+1; f b(At; gt; Bt 1); Bmaxt+1 )) + Pc(At+1; gt+1; f b(At; gt; Bt 1); Bmaxt+1 )(1  )
Then, from the above two equations (C.1) and (C.2), I obtain the following equation:
Bt 1 +Gt + Zt   Tt
f b(At; gt; B 1)
= Et
C(At; gt; Bt 1)
C(At+1; gt+1; f b(At; gt; Bt 1); Bmaxt+1 )
 (C.3)
 (1  Pc(At+1; gt+1; f b(At; gt; Bt 1); Bmaxt+1 )) + Pc(At+1; gt+1; f b(At; gt; Bt 1); Bmaxt+1 )(1  )
The decision rule for the newly issued government bonds, Bt = f b(At; gt; Bt 1) is
derived as follows,
Flow of Programming
1. Discretize the state space of TFP (At), government consumption (gt) and govern-
ment bonds issued at the previous period (Bt 1). The number of grid points of
TFP and government consumption is the same as the computation of the scal
limit. I set the government bonds (Bt 1) between 0 and 2.5 times the steady
state level of GDP, taking 100 grid points. Make an initial guess for the issuance
of government bonds f b0(At; gt; Bt 1).
2. Evaluate the probability of crisis EtPc;t+1 outsides grid points of conjectured gov-
ernment bond issuance f bi 1(At; gt; Bt 1) by using the piecewise linear interpola-
tion method, and compute endogenous variables of current and expected values
in the next period for each grid point.
3. Update the guess of government bond issuance f bi (At; gt; Bt 1) from the old deci-
sion rule f bi 1(At; gt; Bt 1) by calculating the numerator of the left hand side and
the right hand side of the equation (C.3).
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4. Check convergence of decision rule f b(At; gt; Bt 1). If the di¤erence between
the updated and old decision rules is small enough (i.e. supjjf bi (At; gt; Bt 1)  
f bi 1(At, gt; Bt 1)jj< ), f b(At; gt; Bt 1) is the decision rule. Otherwise, go back
to procedure 2.
C.3 Additional Explanation of Decision Rule
In the section 4.2, I explain decision rules of issuance of government bonds, probability
of crisis and price of government bonds only in the case of steady state of TFP and
government consumption. This appendix explores the decision rule on three variables
in di¤erent cases of TFP and government consumption in Figure 3.6.
The left side of the three graphs shows three di¤erent levels of TFP xing govern-
ment consumption at the steady state, and the right graphs are the cases of di¤erent
government consumption. Decision rules of government bonds indicate that govern-
ment bonds are on divergent paths under the situation of low TFP and high government
consumption. On the other hand, the government can lower its debt in the case of high
TFP and low government consumption, but the decision rule is also on a divergent path
as the price of its bonds declines.
The middle two graphs show the probability of crisis based on the previous debt
amount. The black dotted curve corresponds to the scal limit in the steady state.
The probability of crisis begins to increase in a relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio under
low TFP and high government consumption cases. The debt-to-GDP ratios in low
TFP and high government consumption cases are 13% and 10% lower than the steady
state to reach the 50% of probability of crisis respectively. Finally, the characteristics
of price of government bonds are two points. First, the prices in high TFP and low
government consumption cases are higher than in the steady state case because the
expected next marginal utility of consumption over the current marginal utility of
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Figure C.3: Decision Rules in Di¤erent States
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(b) Probability of Crisis
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(c) Price of Government Bond
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consumption in these states is higher. Second, because the probability of crisis begins
to increase in the relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio (around 100%) in low TFP and high
government consumption states, the price of government bonds also begins to decrease
at a relatively lower level of debt.
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C.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In addition to the alternative scenario related to government policies in section 3.4.3,
this appendix reports changes in several parameters. The e¤ects on main variables in
the tables columns show changes from baseline values.
Table C.1: Sensitivity Analysis
Average Crisis Average E¤ects on Main Variables
D/GDP Freq. Spread GDP Import G. Dome. G. Tax Rev.
Data 67.6% 0.60% 0.71% - - - -
Base 47.0% 0.75% 5.78% - - - -
(1) Discount factor (:0.91)
0.89: 66.9% 1.61% 16.14% (0.2, -0.2) (0.4, -1.0) (-0.0, -0.3) (-0.7, -0.2)
0.93: 23.1% 0.20% 1.32% (-0.8, 0.1) (-1.0, 0.9) (-0.8, 0.3) (1.8, 0.1)
(2) Imported intermediate goods with working capital (: 0.7)
0.4: 47.5% 0.76% 5.82% (0.5, 2.3) (0.5, 5.3) (0.4, 1.7) (-0.0, 2.3)
1.0: 47.7% 0.76% 5.81% (-0.3, -2.8) (-0.4, -5.9) (-0.3, -2.0) (-0.2, -2.8)
(3) Armington weight of domestic inputs (: 0.81)
0.76: 44.0% 0.71% 6.35% (-3.6, -4.3) (6.0, 5.0) (-3.9, -4.7) (-4.0, -4.3)
0.86: 50.0% 0.78% 4.86% (4.9, 5.4) (-7.4, -6.5) (4.6, 5.1) (4.9, 5.4)
(4) Elasticity of transfers to productivity (Rd=GDPd: 0.40)
0.42 47.9% 0.76% 5.92% (-0.1, -1.0) (-0.1, -2.9) (-0.3, -1.2) (0.1, 3.9)
Note: The rst and second elements in the parentheses show the percentage di¤erence from the baseline
in the normal and crisis states respectively.
Figure C.4: Crisis Probability (Fiscal Limit) under Di¤erent Discount Factors
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First, in section (1) of Table C.1, I examine the case that the discount factor
changes two points from the baseline scenario of 0:91. When the discount factor is
0.89, the scal limit and price of government bonds are lower than in the baseline
scenario (the lower and higher scal limits are depicted in Figure C.4). Thus, the
crisis frequency and average bond spread are higher than the baseline, and that leads
to a high average debt-to-GDP ratio. The e¤ects on main variables are not so strong
because the discount factor does not a¤ect these variables directly. Section (2) shows
cases of changing the value of the upper bound proportion of imported intermediate
goods which require working capital. If this proportion increases, nal goods rms have
to disburse more interest payments on imported intermediate goods especially in the
crisis state. Thus, the amount of imports of intermediate goods from foreign countries
decreases and eventually GDP decreases. Section (3) reports the result of di¤erent
values of Armington weight of domestic inputs, . A high value of  means that the
xed amount of production is less costly because the price of domestic intermediate
goods is lower than for imported intermediate goods. Thus, the amount of imports
declines, but other variables such as GDP, domestic intermediate goods and tax revenue
increase. However, the debt-to-GDP ratio, crisis frequency and bond spread do not
change much because the steady state level of GDP increases, and that increases the
base values of government consumption and transfers. Section (4) shows the e¤ect
of high tax rates in the crisis state. The 5% increase of tax rate reduces GDP, the
amount of imports and domestic intermediate goods production by 1.0%, 2.9% and
1.2% respectively in the crisis state, but tax revenue increases 3.9% from the baseline
value.
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C.5 Data
 Public Debt-to-GDP: The measurement is annual gross rate. The data source
is OECD. The data used in the baseline simulation in gure 3.9 is quarterly
debt-to-GDP ratio from Eurostat.
 GDP: The data is seasonally adjusted quarterly real gross domestic product of
the expenditure approach. The source is OECD.
 Government Transfer: The data is annual social benets and transfers in kind.
The source is OECD.
 HouseholdsConsumption: The measurement is quarterly, real and seasonally
adjusted. The source is OECD.
 Imported Intermediate Goods: The period is early 2000s. The source is OECDs
STAN Input-Output data.
 Imports of goods and services: The measurement is quarterly, real and seasonally
adjusted. The source is OECD.
 Domestic Intermediate Goods: The measurement is annual and real. The source
is ECB.
 Hours Worked: The data is total employment of the average annual hours actual
worked per worker. The source is OECD.
 Tax Revenue: The measurement is annual and real. The source is OECD.
 CDS: The data is senior 5-year government bonds. The source is Thomson
Reuters.
 Bond Spread: The data is quarterly interest rate on 10-year Spanish government
bonds minus that of German government bonds. The source is OECD.
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 TFP: The data is seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP per person employed. The
source is OECD.
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Appendix D
Chapter 4 Appendix
D.1 Diagrams
Figure D.1: The Sketch of My Model
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D.2 Computatinal Algorithm
Similar to chapter 3, I separately calculate the normal and crisis states. In the
crisis state, the current endogenous variables are calculated for each grid point of
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(Kt 1; At; gt). In the normal state, the computational algorithm is as follows:
1. Discretize the state space of TFP (At), government consumption (gt), capital
stock (Kt 1) and government bonds issued at the previous period (Bt 1). I adopt
Tauchens method (1986) for the state space of TFP and government consumption
and uniformly take 25 points, following equations (4.4) and (4.2). Capital stock
is discretized between 0.8 and 1.5 times of the steady state level of capital, taking
40 grid points, and the government bonds is also discretized between 0 and 2.5
times the steady state level of GDP, taking 40 grid points. Make an initial guess
for the issuance of government bonds f b0(At; gt; Kt 1; Bt 1).
2. Evaluate the probability of crisis in the next period Et[Pc;t+1] following the equa-
tion (4.26) and compute endogenous variables for each grid point.
3. Update the guess of government bond issuance f bi (At; gt; Kt 1; Bt 1) from the
old decision rule f bi 1(At; gt; Kt 1; Bt 1) by calculating the government new bond
issuance rule (4.7).
4. Check convergence of decision rule f b(At; gt; Kt 1; Bt 1). If the di¤erence between
the updated and old decision rules is small enough (i.e. supjjf bi (At; gt; Kt 1; Bt 1) 
f bi 1(At, gt; Kt 1; Bt 1)jj< ), f b(At; gt; Kt 1; Bt 1) is the decision rule. Other-
wise, go back to procedure 2.
D.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Table D.1 reports e¤ects on the economy by changing several important parameters.
Section (1) is the case that changes the scal limit by 10% points of the debt-
to-GDP ratio from the baseline value of 140%. In the case of a low scal limit, the
average debt-to-GDP ratio is lower, the frequency of crisis is higher and the average
bond spread is higher than the baseline case. Because the government falls into the
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Table D.1: Sensitivity Analysis
Average Crisis Average E¤ect on Main Variables
D/GDP Freq. Spread GDP Import G. Dome. G. Tax Rev.
Data 95.9% 0.53% 2.27% - - - -
Base 97.2% 0.55% 9.44% - - - -
(1) Fiscal limit shape, low probability (bl: 1.4)
1.3: 89.4% 1.24% 10.75% (1.2, 0.2) (3.7, 0.2) (1.6, 0.1) (-1.7, 0.2)
1.5: 100.7% 0.11% 8.42% (-1.2, -0.2) (-3.3, -0.2) (-1.3, 0.1) (1.7, -0.0)
(2) Armington weight of domestic inputs (: 0.6)
0.5 86.5% 0.10% 8.36% (-7.1, -12.7) (18.7, 9.5) (-13.3, -16.2) (-8.1, -10.8)
0.7 100.5% 1.10% 10.65% (6.6, 13.1) (-22.0, -16.0) (12.3, 15.7) (7.6, 10.4)
(3) Substitution elasticity across intermediate goods ( : 0.7)
0.5 91.4% 0.14% 8.55% (-0.7, -5.9) (21.2, 23.6) (-10.9, -21.2) (-1.0, -3.4)
0.9 96.8% 1.03% 10.16% (1.1, 5.4) (-17.7, -23.4) (9.6, 16.5) (0.1, 3.1)
Note: The rst and second elements in the parentheses show the percentage di¤erence from the baseline
in the normal and crisis states respectively.
crisis with a lower level of debt, GDP and both imported and domestic intermediate
goods are higher than the baseline. That leads to a lower tax rate and less tax revenue.
Section (2) reports the case of Armington weight of domestic inputs , shifting 0.1
points from the baseline scenario. The low value of this parameter leads to low average
debt-to-GDP ratio, low frequency of crisis and low average spread. The level of GDP
declines because nal goods rms need to rely on costly imported intermediate goods.
Section (3) shows the result of changing the elasticity of substitution across domestic
and foreign intermediate goods  . As the previous section, the low value is more secure
than the baseline case, but that leads to a slightly lower level of GDP.
D.4 Data
 Government Debt to GDP: The measurement is annual gross rate. The source
from 1995 to 2014 is the historical public debt database (September 2012 ver-
sion) of IMF Fiscal A¤airs Department. The data in the baseline simulation is
quarterly debt-to-GDP ratio from Eurostat.
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 GDP: The data is seasonally adjusted quarterly real gross domestic product of
the expenditure approach. The source is OECD.
 Government Consumption: The data is annual nal consumption expenditure of
general government. The source is OECD.
 Government Transfers: The data is annual social benets and transfers in kind.
The source is OECD.
 HouseholdsConsumption: The measurement is quarterly, real and seasonally
adjusted. The source is OECD.
 Imported Intermediate Goods: The period is early 2000s. The source is OECDs
STAN Input-Output data.
 Imports of goods and services: The measurement is quarterly, real and seasonally
adjusted. The source is OECD.
 Domestic Intermediate Goods: The measurement is annual and real. The source
is ECB.
 Hours Worked: The data is total employment of the average annual hours actual
worked per worker. The source is OECD.
 Capital: The data is private capital stock measured in constant 2011 international
dollars. The source is IMF Fiscal A¤airs Department.
 Tax Revenue: The measurement is annual and real. The source is OECD.
 CDS: The data is senior 5-year government bond. The source is Thomson
Reuters.
 Bond Spread: The data is the quarterly interest rate on 10-year Greek government
bonds minus that of German government bonds. The source is OECD.
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 TFP: The data is seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP per person employed. The
source is OECD.
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